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ABSTRACT 
Collaborative Traffic Monitoring, CTM, systems collect information from users in 
the aim of generating a global picture of traffic status. Users send their location information 
including speed and directions, and in return they get reports about traffic in certain 
regions. There are two major approaches for the deployment of CTM systems. The first 
approach relies on dedicated communication infrastructure (DI). This approach is still being 
investigated by researchers and there is no important deployments done yet. The other 
approach utilizes existing communication infrastructures (EI) such as Wi-Fi, GSM, and 
GPRS for communication between users and traffic server.  
Due to the sensitivity of location information, different privacy preserving techniques 
have been proposed for both DI and EI approaches. In DI approach the concentration was 
on anonymous access using pseudonyms. In EI approach privacy techniques concentrate on 
hiding the identity of a particular user within other k-1 users at the same region or time 
stamp by using cloaking. Cloaking means generalization of location or time stamp so that 
other k-1 users will have the same generalized value. Unfortunately, cloaking decreases the 
quality of the data and requires a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to determine the cloaked 
region or cloaked time stamp. 
In this thesis, we propose a Privacy Aware Collaborative Traffic Monitoring System 
(PA-CTM) that considers the privacy and security properties of VANETs and existing 
infrastructures. PA-CTM provides a client server architecture that relies on existing 
infrastructures and enhances privacy by (1) Using a robust Collusion Resistant Pseudonym 
Providing System, CoRPPS, for anonymous access. Users are able to change their 
pseudonyms and hence hide their complete trajectory information form traffic server; (2) 
Utilizing a novel Autonomous Location Update Mechanism, ALUM, that does not rely on a 
Trusted Third Party and uses only local parameters (speed and direction) for triggering a 
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location update or pseudonym change. Our performance results showed that CoRPPS 
provides a high level of anonymity with strong resistant against collusion attacks. 
Performance results also showed that ALUM is effective for traffic monitoring in terms of 
both privacy and utility.  
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ÖZET 
İşbirlikçi Trafik İzleme, İTİ, sistemleri trafik durumunun geniş çaplı resmini 
oluşturmak amacıyla kullanıcılardan bilgi toplarlar. Kullanıcılardan gelen hız ve yönleriyle 
beraber konum bilgilerini yorumlayan bu sistemler, karşılık olarak istenilen bölgelerdeki 
trafik durumu hakkında rapor gönderirler. İTİ sistemlerinin konuşlandırılması için iki temel 
yaklaşım vardır. İlk yaklaşım özel iletişim altyapısı’na (ÖA) dayanır. Araştırmacılar 
tarafından halen incelenmekte olan bu yaklaşımın henüz önemli bir konuşlandırması 
bulunmamaktadır. Diğer yaklaşım ise kullanıcılar ve trafik sunucusu arasındaki iletişim 
için Wi-Fi, GSM ve GPRS gibi mevcut iletişim altyapılarını (MA) kullanır. 
Konum bilgisinin hassasiyeti nedeniyle, ÖA ve MA yaklaşımlarının her ikisi için de 
farklı mahremiyet koruma teknikleri önerilmiştir. ÖA yaklaşımında mahlas kullanarak 
anonim erişim sağlamaya önem verilmiştir. MA yaklaşımında ise aynı alan veya zaman 
damgası içerisindeki k farklı kullanıcı arasından belirli bir kullanıcının kimliğini saklamak 
için geri kalan k-1 kullanıcı perdeleme  görevi görür. Yer veya zaman damgası bilgisinin 
genelleştirilmesini sağlayan perdeleme yöntemi sayesinde, geriye kalan k-1 kullanıcı aynı 
genelleştirilmiş değerlere sahip olmaktadır. Ne yazık ki, perdeleme yöntemi verilerin 
kalitesini düşürmekte ve perdelenmiş yer veya zaman damgası bilgisinin belirlenmesi için 
Güvenilir Üçüncü Parti’ye (GÜP) ihtiyaç duymaktadır. 
Bu tezde, VANET’lerin ve mevcut altyapıların mahremiyet ve güvenlik özelliklerini 
gözeten bir Mahremiyet Bilinçli İşbirlikçi Trafik İzleme (MB-İTİ) sistemi öneriyoruz. MB-
İTİ mevcut altyapılara dayanan bir istemci sunucu mimarisi ile mahremiyeti artırmak için 
(1) anonim erişim için güçlü bir Danışıklı Hileye Dayanıklı Mahlas Sağlama Sistemi, 
DHDMSS, kullanır. Kullanıcılar mahlaslarını değiştirebildiklerinden dolayı izledikleri 
yörüngeyi trafik sunucularından saklayabilirler; (2) Güvenilir Üçüncü Parti’ye ihtiyaç 
duymayan ve konum güncelleme veya mahlas değişikliği için sadece yerel parametrelerden 
(hız ve yön) faydalanan orjinal bir Özerk Yer Güncelleme Mekanizması (ÖYGM) kullanır. 
Performans sonuçlarımız, DHDMSS yüksek düzeyde anonimlik ile beraber danışıklı hile 
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saldırılarına karşı güçlü bir direnç sağladığını göstermiştir. Aynı zamanda, performans 
sonuçlarımız ÖYGM’nın mahremiyet ve hizmet bakımından trafik izleme için etkili 
olduğunu da göstermiştir. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Traffic monitoring systems have evolved rapidly in the last years due to the advances 
in communication technologies such as GPS, GSM and 3G networks. The main idea behind 
Collaborative Traffic Monitoring (CTM) systems is that users provide their location 
information to have a global model of the current traffic [1]. CTM systems are critical 
nowadays especially in big cities with heavy and sometimes unpredictable traffic. 
However, privacy is considered a major obstacle in front of turnouts of users to these 
systems [2,3].  
1.1 Motivation 
In this Section, we first list the driving forces behind the widespread of CTM 
systems. Then we list the motivation towards deployment of a privacy preserving CTM 
system.  
1.1.1 Motivation for Collaborative Traffic Monitoring  
Collaborative Traffic Monitoring (CTM) has recently become a hot research topic for 
the great benefits such as time and energy saving, environmental protection, and traffic 
safety. The main driving force of CTM is the rapid increase of the amount of vehicles 
relative to new road openings [4]. CTM systems utilize disseminated information to save 
time for system users by providing them with route information and expected delays. 
Besides the time savings, it also saves fuel consumption by decreasing the waiting time 
while engine is on. Royal Automobile Club of Queensland in Australia (RACQ) reported 
that fuel consumption increases by 30% when there is congestion in traffic [6].  The 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology [5], has reported that about 44% of 
congestion may be avoided using CTM systems. It has also reported significant results 
about fatal accident reductions and money savings as well.  
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CTM systems also help decrease pollution and carbon monoxide (CO) and carbon 
dioxide (CO2) levels due to less waiting time on traffic queues. As a remedy for air 
pollution in Southern California, the Association of Governments suggested improving 
transportation system by utilizing CTM systems [6].  
Many accidents can be avoided by providing emergency messages for vehicles in the 
neighborhood. This implies saving lives and money. According to CARE reports, it was 
found that 60% of accidents are caused by driver behavior [7]. This means that these 
accidents can be reduced by providing drivers with useful and emergency information. 
Many insurance companies have provided new policies regarding the driving 
behavior of policy holders. Insurance companies may decrease the policy cost of the driver 
according to her driving behavior. These insurance companies can rely on CTM systems 
for generating the driver behavior [8]. 
1.1.2 Motivation for Privacy Preserving CTM Systems 
Privacy is defined as “the ability of an individual or group to seclude themselves or 
information about themselves and thereby revealing themselves selectively”1. 
Location privacy is defined as “The ability of an individual to move in public space 
with the expectation that under normal circumstances her location will not be 
systematically and secretly recorded for later use” [9]. 
People do not want being virtually tracked while they are driving so that no one can 
identify them using their routes.  Therefore, their movement information should be hidden 
from others. Otherwise, privacy requirements of CTM users cannot be fulfilled.  
In his very informative lecture about location privacy in mobile world, Al Gidari [10] 
gave plenty of examples on how location information can be used to reveal lots of private 
information. He also recommended changing  the law that governs  location information 
                                                 
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personal_privacy 
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history in United States of America with a new standard that addresses all possible 
directions such as the duration of storing data, how frequently to answer the query, etc. 
CTM systems require the users to provide their exact locations periodically to come 
up with an accurate traffic estimate. This location disclosure may reveal lots of private 
information of CTM users including route disclosure of a particular user. It also enables 
user profiling by gathering information of places of interest for that user [2,11].   
The widespread use of smart phones with GPS technologies made the tracking of 
users easier by providing their exact locations together with their timestamps. This crowded 
data carry huge risks of privacy leakage, which should be considered in designing CTM 
systems. However, the existence of these mobile phone networks reduced the infrastructure 
cost required for building the CTM systems by utilizing existing networks rather than 
establishing new dedicated ones [12]. 
Also Patrick [13] did a study on the concept of Ambient Intelligence (AmI). The 
concept AmI arises from the convergence of ubiquitous computing, ubiquitous 
communication, and intelligent user friendly interface. This implies that a person is 
surrounded by computing and networking technologies that are aware of his presence. He 
analyzed the concept “AmI” over European Union data protection law. Then he used his 
analysis to develop an argument for all regulatory solutions that enforce protection of 
private data. The paper concluded that “AmI” concept presents a significant threat to 
personal privacy. 
An interesting study was done by Cvrcek et al. [14] on some European countries 
about the price of their location privacy for different periods of time. The study showed that 
good percentage of people are aware of their location privacy and deal carefully regarding 
that issue. 
In their website
2
, Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) published an essay regarding 
location privacy. They said that it is not only the government that people have to be afraid 
                                                 
2 www.eff.org 
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of disclosing location information to, but also they need to hide information from other 
people.  They gave different examples about that. They also concluded that this is the time 
for organizations to show leadership and select designs that respects and protects users’ 
privacy [9]. 
From the above, we have no doubt about the importance of privacy in the presence of 
data mining tools. The privacy risk involves different parts of society starting from regular 
people up to companies and even political parties. Few examples include having a girl 
friend while being married. Also political communications between parties may be 
disclosed too.  Companies’ communications may be revealed by tracking CEO’s and their 
meetings; this may affect the shares of involved companies. One can imagine different 
scenarios for different parts of society which at the end lead to affect the whole society. 
For a more concrete example, consider the following scenario. Mr. X is a teacher 
working in a school somewhere in a city.  He used to go from his house to school and 
return back regularly. Recently, he started to visit a cancer medical center regularly and 
stays there for hours.  Mr. X was planning to buy a life insurance policy before he was 
diagnosed.  If the insurance agents infer his periodic visits to the cancer center, such breach 
of location info may affect the price of his insurance policy or even the refusal of selling 
him the policy. This also leads to a disclosure of being infected with cancer. Of course Mr. 
X does not want anyone to know about his disease. This example is one of many scenarios 
that include privacy violation using location information. 
1.2 Objectives of the Thesis 
Existing CTM solutions generally use two different methodologies. The first one is 
the dedicated infrastructure approach, also called VANETs (Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks), 
where a dedicated infrastructure for communication is deployed; we call this approach DI 
for short. The second methodology utilizes existing wireless networks, such as GSM, 
GPRS, EDGE, UMTS and Wi-Fi; we call this approach Existence Infrastructure, EI. DI 
requires investments in deployments of the dedicated infrastructure that is not widely done 
yet.  
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DI users use pseudonyms for anonymous access to traffic server. DI approaches 
concentrate on anonymous access for preserving privacy and do not concentrate well on 
preserving privacy of location information [21,29,30,31]. 
On the other hand, EI approaches utilize different mechanisms for preserving location 
information privacy with little concentration on anonymous access. Our objective is to 
develop an EI CTM system that is equivalent (in terms of privacy and security) to the DI 
approach, i.e. a CTM system that combines both anonymous access of DI and location 
information privacy mechanisms of EI. The challenge is to design a system that allows 
anonymous access for users and maintains a back door for identity revealing under law 
enforcement purposes only. Another challenge is to protect anonymous users from being 
identified via their location information. Overall, the system should be efficient for traffic 
monitoring in terms of utility metrics.  
1.3 Contributions 
The aim of the thesis is to build a Privacy Aware Collaborative Traffic Monitoring 
System (PA-CTM), that is aware of users’ privacy and depends on existing communication 
infrastructures instead of having dedicated infrastructure.  The design of our PA-CTM is 
divided into two stages: (1) The first stage is the design of a Collusion Resistant 
Pseudonym Providing System (CoRPPS). CoRPPS will be used to register users and 
provide them with pseudonyms that enable them to anonymously access traffic server. (2) 
The second stage is the design of a novel Autonomous Location Update Mechanism 
(ALUM) that enhances privacy without depending on Trusted Third Parties (TTPs). ALUM 
controls the location update and pseudonym change to enhance the privacy level of users 
and avoid privacy leakage using spatiotemporal data. 
In this first contribution, we have designed a novel collusion resistant anonymous 
access system called CoRPPS [15,16]. CoRPPS enables users to anonymously access a 
service while maintaining a backdoor for identity revealing under law enforcement 
purposes only. Identity revealing in CoRPPS is fair, i.e. it is neither punitive in a way that it 
allows TTPs to reveal past and future anonymity of a particular user, nor restrictive in a 
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way that it allows revealing only current pseudonym. CoRPPS distributes trust among 
different entities and maintains a level of anonymity for users. Collusion among a subset of 
these entities, in the aim of revealing a real identity, is avoided in CoRPPS. The backdoor 
of identity revealing for law enforcement purposes works only when all of the trusted 
entities participate in the process. CoRPPS is also flexible and can be applied to different 
anonymous access services by tuning CoRPPS parameters accordingly. Experimental 
results show that CoRPPS is resistant to collusions among its trusted parties. CoRPPS 
guarantees a level of anonymity for users at each authentication server. CoRPPS will be 
used as the pseudonym providing system for our Privacy Aware Collaborative Traffic 
Monitoring system. 
In the second contribution, we developed an Autonomous Location Update 
Mechanism, ALUM, which enhances location privacy for users without the need for a TTP. 
ALUM relies only on local parameters (speed and direction) for triggering a location 
update and a pseudonym change and does not need to communicate with other parties 
[17,18]. By utilizing local parameters, ALUM is able to avoid redundant location updates 
and hence reduce communication cost which is a major factor in the widespread of CTM 
system. Experimental results show that ALUM enhances privacy while maintaining a good 
level of area coverage and reducing communication cost. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 introduces background about CTM. It describes properties of both 
Dedicated and Existing communication Infrastructure CTM systems (DI and EI 
respectively). Different location update mechanisms are reported with their pros and cons. 
Related works for both EI and DI approaches are reported as well.  We also provid a 
general description of our privacy preserving CTM design. An introduction to our privacy 
aware CTM system is presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 we present our Collusion 
Resistant Pseudonym Providing System, CoRPPS. We introduce the design, 
communication and flow, properties, and resistant against attacks. Chapter 5 reports the 
performance analysis of CoRPPS. Analysis includes anonymity, collision probability, and 
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collusion among authentication servers. Autonomous Location Update Mechanism, 
ALUM, is provided in Chapter 6. The main idea of ALUM is introduced. We also 
introduce an enhanced mechanism called EALUM. Experimental results for ALUM are 
provided in Chapter 7. These analyses include k-anonymity, Relative Area Coverage, RAC, 
and Relative Communication Cost, RCC. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the work and 
highlights future research directions. 
1.5 Summary  
In this chapter, we gave an introduction of our thesis, the objectives and motivations 
as well as expected contributions of our thesis. The structure of our thesis is also provided. 
In the next chapter we will provide a background and an intensive survey of related work. 
We will also list the different approaches used in Collaborative traffic monitoring systems, 
as well as describing different location update mechanisms used in these systems. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, we introduce background of Collaborative Traffic Monitoring, CTM, 
systems basics. The background includes CTM systems communications infrastructures 
and their properties, recent deployments of CTM systems, and location update mechanisms 
and privacy issues of CTM systems.    
2.1 Collaborative Traffic Monitoring Systems 
The main idea behind Collaborative Traffic Monitoring (CTM) systems is that users 
provide their location information to obtain a global view of the current status of traffic. 
CTM systems are critical nowadays especially in big cities with heavy and sometimes 
unpredictable traffic. Widespread usage of CTM systems would alleviate the congestion in 
big cities by proposing alternative routes to the users and avoiding more cars entering the 
congested areas. In this way, CTM systems would save time and money, and more 
importantly decrease carbon emission by optimizing the traffic. CTM systems depend on a 
basic architecture that specifies how entities communicate together 
2.2 Communication Infrastructures of CTM Systems  
CTM systems use client-server architecture. Clients send their location information to 
a traffic server; the latter provides clients with a real time map about traffic in vicinity [1]. 
There are two main communication infrastructure approaches for CTM systems. The first 
one is the Dedicated Infrastructure (DI) approach, this approach is also called VANETs 
(Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks), where a dedicated infrastructure for communication is 
deployed [2,19,20,21,22]. The second methodology utilizes existing wireless networks, 
such as GSM, GPRS, EDGE, UMTS and Wi-Fi for communication with traffic server 
[17,23,24,25].  
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2.2.1 Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network Dedicated Communication Infrastructure 
The Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network, VANET, is a technology that uses moving vehicles 
as nodes in a network to create a mobile network. Each vehicle takes on the role of sender, 
receiver, and router to broadcast information to the network. This information is then used 
to ensure safe and free flow of traffic. Vehicles are equipped with some sort of radio 
interface called OnBoard Unit (OBU) that enables communication with other vehicles and 
with Road Side Units (RSU). Vehicles are also equipped with hardware that permits 
detailed position information such as Global Positioning System (GPS). Fixed RSUs, which 
are connected to the backbone network, must be in place to facilitate communication. 
VANETs use Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) which is a short to 
medium range communications service that was developed to support Vehicle-to-Vehicle 
(V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications. Different standards (IEEE 
802.11p, Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE), and IEEE 1609) have been 
developed for VANETs.  These standards form the basis for deployment of VANETs and 
their communications [26,27]. Figure 1 shows a snapshot of a VANET where vehicles 
communicate with each other and with road side units.  
 
Figure 2: VANETs architecture 
One of the mechanisms used for Authentication in VANETS is digital signature. 
Because of the large number of network members and variable connectivity to 
authentication servers, a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used for authentication where 
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each vehicle would be provided with a public/private key pair. Public keys are used as 
pseudonyms and are changed frequently for security and privacy issues [28,29]. 
2.2.2 Properties of VANETs Architectures 
Due to the sensitivity of location data and its power to reveal real identities of users 
using data mining tools, different privacy preserving and secure techniques have been 
proposed. An important technique is the use of temporary public/private key pairs for 
authentication. These pairs form temporary identities for vehicles; hence they are used as 
pseudonyms. These pseudonyms are changed from time to time. This, in turn, is expected 
to hide the complete trajectory of a particular vehicle [21,30]. However, it is sometimes 
possible to link two pseudonyms and hence to link the corresponding locations updates. 
One way to tackle with this problem is to use mix zones. A mix zone is a region where – 
upon entrance - vehicles change their pseudonyms together, the new pseudonyms are mixed 
together and linking old and new pseudonyms becomes more difficult [29,31]. 
Generally, VANETs concentrate on anonymous access for users and do not deal 
efficiently with privacy of location data itself, i.e. privacy issues related to location points. 
Location data without identities contain sensitive information that may lead to the 
disclosure of the user’s real identity. Because of the vehicle to vehicle (V2V) 
communication in VANETs, complex security protocols should be implemented to detect 
and prevent collusion among vehicles and other types of attacks [32]. Unfortunately, 
preventing V2V communication requires deployment of a very large number of RSUs to 
cover the entire region. This is very expensive and needs much more time to be done. 
2.2.3 Recent Deployments of VANETs 
Different trials of deploying VANETs were done in U.S.A, Europe, and Japan [19]. 
There are many national and international projects supported by government, industry, and 
academia devoted to these field trials. These include consortia such as the Vehicle Safety 
Consortium (VSC) in the U.S.A., Car-to-Car Communications Consortium (C2CCC) 
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sponsored by the European Union, and the Advanced Safety Vehicle Program (ASV) in 
Japan. However, these deployments are relatively restricted in terms of services and 
geographical coverage. A full VANET deployment requires installation of new 
infrastructure, which is hard to be globally achieved in the next 10 years. Recently, the use 
of collaborative traffic monitoring systems that utilizes existing communication 
infrastructures is more promising such as [24,25,33]. 
2.3 Utilizing Existing Communication Infrastructures 
EI approach is based on the utilization of existing underlying infrastructure such as 
cellular and wireless networks to set up the CTM system. The architecture is a client server 
architecture where client sends her information to the traffic server and gets a complete 
overview of traffic from that server. The client is assumed to have a positioning device 
such as GPS receiver to calculate her location, and a mobile communication device to 
communicate with the traffic server [3,23,24,33,34]. Most recent mobile phones are 
equipped with GPS and with many wireless communication capabilities such as GSM, Wi-
Fi, GPRS, EDGE, etc. Figure 2 shows the general architecture of EI CTM systems.  
 
Figure 3: EI communication infrastructure 
Utilizing existing communication infrastructures accelerates the development of 
traffic monitoring system because there will be no need for new communication 
infrastructure deployments.  
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Anonymous access with EI systems is limited to the use of a nickname; all location 
updates of a particular user are associated with her nickname. Some systems allow users to 
appear as anonymous on their live maps; however, this does not protect the privacy of that 
user. Also modern EI approaches for CTM systems do not support identity revealing for 
law enforcement purposes. This reduces the adoption of these systems by related 
authorities.    
2.3.1 Properties of EI Architectures 
Existing EI architectures depend on a Trusted Third Party, TTP, to protect user’s 
privacy. TTP may breach user’s privacy by revealing her location information.  Different 
systems have been proposed to mitigate this full trust. A popular proposed solution is called 
cloaking. Cloaking means hiding the real data (location, time) with data of other objects by 
expanding exact location or time values to values where k other objects have [35,36,37]. 
Cloaking generates better privacy levels with less accurate data. However, cloaking still 
requires a trusted third party to calculate the boundaries of the cloaked region.  The user 
sends her location to a cloaking server (sometimes called an anonymizer); the latter 
calculates the coordinates of the region where k users exist including the applying user. The 
user, then, replaces her exact location with these coordinates. There are different variations 
of cloaking; however, they still depend on a TTP which is not preferable for privacy issues. 
2.3.2 EI Recent Deployments 
One popular EI CTM system is called WAZE (waze.com). WAZE was founded first 
in Israel in 2006; now, it is being used in the USA and in some European countries. WAZE 
is a free system and requires a new user to register with her email address and then she 
receives her password via an SMS to her mobile phone. The system has evolved rapidly 
and it collects data from registered drivers. The system requires users to be connected to the 
Internet via some communication technology such as 3G, Wi-Fi, etc. 
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In WAZE, users authenticate using a user name and a password, users are allowed to 
use nick names for their activities. Although WAZE is becoming more popular, there are 
privacy risks associated with using this system: 
1. WAZE users authenticate using a permanent user name and password. Misbehaving 
users may abuse the system by providing their user name and password to others. 
Imagine a CTM user recording a path in Istanbul, and after five minutes, the same 
user name recorded a path in Ankara. This abuse may affect the accuracy of the 
system. 
2. Users are allowed to make changes on the map by recording a new track or 
changing a name of a place. WAZE cannot validate suggested updates/changes. It 
also does not protect privacy of others. Consider a WAZER who recorded the name 
of his neighbor on the location of his neighbor’s house, and his neighbor does not 
want to disclose his address to public. This violates the neighbor’s privacy and 
should not be allowed. Or at least liability issues have to be executed and the one 
who violates should be responsible for that violation. 
3. By the use of nick name of a person, it is very easy to track all places that this user 
visited. Suppose a user with nick name X is using WAZE, all location information 
she sends to the server are saved with her nick name. So, by simply searching the 
database for that nick name, all her location information will be available without 
having to mine them. This violates her privacy and may reveal her real identity too.  
Therefore it is necessary enhance WAZE with privacy enhancing mechanisms to 
protect users privacy.  
Google provides live traffic reports included within the Google maps interface. This 
service is not available for all cities. It is available in the USA, Canada, and some European 
cities as well. The traffic reports are updated every five to ten minutes and are currently 
available on Google Maps and Google Maps for mobile, and Google Maps Navigation. The 
live reports help to avoid heavily congested roads and they also offer alternative routes. 
The traffic reports are useful for people who want to plan their routes ahead. Using 
previously stored traffic information, you select the time, date, location and the traffic 
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reports will provide a trend in traffic levels. Thereby enabling users to plan ahead and avoid 
heavily congested roads. 
Google traffic data come directly from local highway authorities, and from GPS 
enabled phones that use Google Maps with the location tracking feature enabled [38]. As 
users move around a city, Google can see how well traffic is flowing along any road and 
will update its live traffic data accordingly. Due to the lack of available traffic data, Google 
live traffic reports mainly covers main roads and highways. 
YANDEX3 is a Russian Internet company that operates the Yandex search engine in 
Russia. It also develops a number of Internet-based services and products including Yandex 
Maps and Yandex Traffic. Yandex Traffic shows the picture of the current traffic 
conditions in a city. It gathers information from different sources, analyses this data, and 
maps the results on the city’s map on Yandex Maps. Yandex users may benefit from traffic 
reports and avoid congestions. It is worth mentioning that Yandex works now in Turkey 
and provides traffic information for cities like Istanbul and Ankara. 
2.4 Location Update Mechanism in CTM Systems  
CTM system requires users to update their location information at the traffic server 
from time to time so that the traffic server will be aware of traffic conditions. Different 
update mechanisms have been proposed in the literature. These update mechanisms vary 
according to their update frequencies and time gaps between successive updates. Here, we 
briefly describe these mechanisms and their pros and cons. 
2.4.1 Periodical Update Mechanism 
In periodical update mechanism, location information is updated periodically at fixed 
time intervals [39]. By carefully fixing the interval between two successive updates, 
periodical update mechanism produces the best data in terms of quality. However, this 
                                                 
3 http://www.yandex.ru/ 
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mechanism suffers from the high probability of linking location updates of a particular 
moving object [30]. This high probability of linking stems from the periodic location 
update pattern that facilitates prediction of the time and location of the next update 
according to current time and speed. This in turn may lead to a partial or even total 
trajectory disclosure of a particular moving object.  
By knowing current position and speed of a particular vehicle at time t1, the expected 
location at time t2 can be calculated by calculating the distance travelled by that vehicle 
during the time interval t2-t1. The distance is calculated as (t2-t1)*speed at time t1 [29]. This 
model assumes a fixed speed interval over the time period t2-t1. There are better 
probabilistic models that incorporate the average speed of the route rather than vehicle’s 
previous speed and use some probabilistic models to link updates according to their 
probabilities of occurrence [21,31].   
2.4.2 Conditional Update Mechanism 
Another location update mechanism suggests to update only if a vehicle crosses a 
boundary [25,34]. This mechanism is called conditional, i.e. location is updated if a 
condition is met. The condition is the cross of a predefined boundary. So if a moving object 
crosses a boundary, then the vehicle should update her location. These boundaries are pre-
selected and distributed to users. The selection of these boundaries should be done carefully 
to ensure well coverage and better privacy.  
This mechanism enables monitoring traffic only around these boundaries and ignores 
other regions. Besides, if a prior knowledge of these boundaries is obtained, then linking of 
location updates will become an easy task. Once two boundaries are compromised, an 
adversary may find out the distance between these boundaries, she also can find an 
estimation of the speed between these boundaries. This will help her to calculate the time of 
the next location update. So the problem becomes similar to the periodic update 
mechanism. Another important drawback of this mechanism is its dependency on a trusted 
third party to generate and distribute these boundaries. 
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2.4.3 Silent Period Mechanism 
Silent period update mechanism suggests that vehicles use random periods of time 
between their successive updates. If a vehicle sends a location update at time t1, then the 
next update will be t1+trand, where trand is a random number sampled randomly from a 
distribution. This random period is called silent period [21,40].  
Because of the lack of periodicity in location updates, silent period makes it difficult 
to link updates of a particular user. However, probabilistic models may still be able to do 
that with high confidence. Using silent period update mechanism will not make it possible 
to catch all traffic conditions in the entire region meaning that it will degrade the feasibility 
of CTM system. 
2.5 How do CTM Systems Become Privacy Invasive 
CTM systems depend on the collection of users’ location data to build and develop 
the system databases required for traffic monitoring and map generation. This data are 
stored in the database as they are collected. The data are then used for creating traffic maps 
and reports. 
CTM systems are self-positioning by which a user sends her location to CTM server. 
Such systems protect privacy if CTM server is a trusted party that does not intentionally or 
unintentionally share the data with other parties. Unfortunately, this may not be the case. 
Different privacy attacks may be applied to such systems such as: 
1. Profiling the user’s behavior: utilizing GPS tracking data of a particular user, and 
with some data mining tools, a user may be profiled to a given group according to 
her preferences and activities [2].  
2. User tracking and identification: with some data mining tools, spatio-temporal data 
can be used to cluster users and then infer their real identities according to their 
routes [11,34].  
17 
 
Location data are sensitive data and may severely harm the user’s privacy. The above 
attacks are general attacks that many other scenarios can be listed below them. The severity 
of the harm depends on the sensitivity of the disclosed information and the related person.  
Political activities, health, ethics, security records, and other information can be 
extracted from location data. This information may be of high sensitivity of a particular 
person, and the disclosure of such information may lead to harmful consequences.  
2.6 Related Work 
There are two stages of our proposed CTM system; the first stage is building the 
anonymous access system where the second is designing the location update mechanism. In 
this Section, we address the related work for both stages. For the sake of simplicity for 
readers, we separated the related work. 
2.6.1 Related Work for Anonymous Access and Pseudonyms Systems 
There are two approaches in the literature that address anonymous service access. The 
first approach is called anonymous blacklisting (a.k.a. anonymous revocation). This 
approach allows revocation of misbehaved users without revealing their real identities. It 
also maintains previous anonymity for even abusive users. The second approach is called 
revocable anonymity. In this approach, abusive users are revoked and their real identities 
are revealed as well.  
In anonymous blacklisting, various Trusted Third Party (TTP) schemes have been 
proposed. These schemes assume a level of trust among parties. The first anonymous TTP 
blacklisting scheme to appear in the literature was proposed by Johnson  et al. and called 
Nymble [41]. Nymble constructs unlinkable authentication token sequences using hash 
chains. A pair of TTPs, the Nymble manager and the pseudonym manager, help the service 
providers to link future tokens from abusive users so their access can be blocked. 
Unfortunately, these TTPs can easily collude to de-anonymize any user.  
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Nymbler [42], BNymble [43], and Jack [44] are similar schemes that have been 
proposed with some performance enhancements on the base scheme Nymble. With the aim 
to force an agreement between users and service providers, Schwartz et al. have proposed a 
contractual anonymity system [45]. In this system, a user is de-anonymized if she breaches 
the contract with the service provider. This system still depends on a TTP.  
BLAC [46], EPID [47], and PEREA [48] are anonymous service access systems in 
which abusive users are revoked without contacting a TTP. In these schemes, service 
providers simply add authentication tokens associated with misuse to a blacklist. When a 
user produces a new authentication token, she must then prove that each token on the 
blacklist is not linked to her new token. This becomes harder to do as the number of users 
and revoked tokens increase. 
Revocable anonymity systems (the second approach) generally depend on 
cryptography to generate and verify anonymous identities that are sometimes called 
pseudonyms. The concept of pseudonyms was introduced by  Chaum [49] as a way of 
allowing users to communicate with different organizations using temporary identities. 
Later, Chaum and Evertse [50] have developed a model for pseudonym systems. They have 
presented their system as an RSA-based implementation. Their scheme relies on a TTP to 
sign all credentials. 
The use of TTP to sign credentials and reveal real identities of pseudonyms was 
employed by many service providing systems such as VANETs (Vehicular Ad hoc 
Networks) described in [30,39,50,51]. In these systems, the authors propose the use of 
pseudonyms to access the service anonymously while maintaining the ability to revoke 
abusive pseudonyms by revealing their real identities. It has been shown that pseudonyms 
may be linked and anonymity may be revealed as well [29]. To overcome the latter 
problem, the concept of mix zones has been proposed by Freduiger et. al. [51]. A mix zone 
is an area where many vehicles change their pseudonyms at the same time, causing new 
pseudonyms to mix together and making it difficult to link old and new pseudonyms. A 
similar approach has been proposed by Lu et. al. [52] utilizing the so-called social spots to 
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create a mix zone. A study of the effect of non-cooperating users at mix zones was done by 
Freudiger et. al. [53];  they also proposed a protocol that deals with non-cooperative users. 
Group signature schemes, such as [54,55,56,57], have been widely used for both 
anonymous blacklisting and revocable anonymity systems. Based on group signature 
features, an open authority can revoke abusive users and may reveal their real identities. 
Figure 3 gives a categorization of anonymous access systems. 
 
Figure 4: Categories of anonymous access systems 
All previous systems are either punitive in a way that they allow TTPs to reveal past 
and future anonymity of a particular user, or they are restrictive in a way that they allow 
revealing only current pseudonym. Each previously described pseudonym system fits to a 
particular service providing systems and may not fit to others; this depends on the nature of 
the service provider. In many applications, such as VANETS, de-anonymization is 
sometimes required for a period of time that may span more than the lifecycle of a single 
pseudonym. Hence, there is a necessity for a flexible system that maintains anonymity, 
distributes trust, and enables fair identity de-anonymization. In this paper, we propose a 
collusion resistant pseudonym providing system that addresses these issues. 
2.6.2 Related Work for CTM  
A secure dedicated infrastructure (DI) system architecture has been proposed by Raya 
et al. [58].  In this scheme, the authors propose the use of pseudonyms for identity hiding. 
Pseudonyms are temporary identifiers that expire after their use. Although pseudonyms 
were temporary identities, it has been shown that it is possible to track pseudonyms 
changes and disclose real identities by using some probabilistic models [29]. 
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To overcome the problem of linking pseudonyms, the concept of mix zones has been 
proposed [51]. Mix zones are hidden areas where users can changes their pseudonyms 
together without being linked. In this way, the pseudonym change is not monitored, and 
hence pseudonyms will not be linked. Pseudonyms and mix zones have been proposed to 
be used in Dedicated Infrastructures (VANETs). However, DI approach is still under 
research [2,28,39] and no important real deployments exist. 
Different online privacy preserving approaches have been proposed for location data. 
One major approach is cloaking, either time, space, or both [25,35,37]. Cloaking is a 
process of generalization, where time or space is expanded so that a k-anonymity level is 
met, k-anonymity refers to the state of being anonymous among other k objects [59]. 
Cloaking gains a guaranteed k-anonymity level on the account of the quality of the data. As 
a drawback, all cloaking techniques rely on either a trusted third party that determines the 
boundaries of the cloaked region [36], or on collaboration among users to update their 
locations together [37]. The latter relies on direct communication between group members, 
and requires trust between them.  
Hoh and Gruteser provided the concept of Virtual Trip Lines (VTL) [25]. A VTL is a 
geographic boundary that is supplied to the client software, and a vehicle must update her 
location upon the cross of that boundary. The system fails to capture traffic conditions apart 
from VTL regions, because vehicles will not update their locations outside VTL regions. 
Besides, if some VTL lines are compromised then it will be easy to link pseudonyms at 
these compromised VTLs. The very much effort done on the choice of VTLs and their 
distribution to users makes the system impractical for a larger number of users. 
In [36], the authors use an anonymization server that anonymizes user locations using 
location cloaking, where location information is perturbed by either spatial range called 
spatial cloaking, or temporal range called temporal cloaking. Thus, exact location 
information is hidden among a range of temporal and spatial coordinates. It guarantees k-
anonymity in both time and space dimensions. But it still relies on a trusted third party and 
also degrades the quality of the data. In [33], the authors suggest a 2 way cloaking 
mechanism, the user sends her cloaked location to an anonymization server, the latter 
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returns a cloaking rectangle that have k other users. Cloaking relies on a trusted third party 
for calculating the safe region; it also reduces the data quality by generalizing location into 
the safe region. A similar approach was used by [37] where users communicate together to 
form a safe region without communicating with a trusted third party, in the latter approach 
users are assumed to be honest and trust each other to calculate the safe region. 
In [1], we studied the challenges of a privacy preserving collaborative traffic 
monitoring systems utilizing existing infrastructure. 
2.7 Summary  
In this chapter, we provided a background and an intensive survey of related work. 
We also listed the different approaches used in collaborative traffic monitoring systems. As 
well as describing different location update mechanisms used in these systems. In the next 
chapter, we provide an introduction about our proposed Privacy Aware Collaborative 
Traffic Monitoring System, PA-CTM.  
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3. OUR PROPOSED PRIVACY AWARE COLLABORATIVE TRAFFIC 
MONITORING SYSTEM DESIGN 
In this chapter, we describe the general design and architecture issues of our PA-
CTM system. Our design is divided into two stages. The first stage is the design of the 
pseudonym signing system that signs pseudonyms required for anonymous access to the 
traffic server. The second stage is the design of location update and pseudonym change 
mechanism that determines when to update a user’s location and when to change the used 
pseudonym. Here, we describe the general design and flow of our PA-CTM, details about 
the first stage and the second stage are done in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 respectively. 
3.1 PA-CTM Architecture  
The architecture of PA-CTM is client server architecture. Users use their signed 
pseudonym to authenticate to traffic server for either updating their location information or 
querying current traffic status. The traffic server collects location information from 
different moving objects (identified by pseudonyms) and provides users with current traffic 
status. Figure 4 shows the general architecture of our PA-CTM system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: PA-CTM general architecture 
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The flow of PA-CTM is performed as follows:  
1. The user generates a number of temporary identities called pseudonyms, and then 
she sends these pseudonyms to the pseudonym signer who in turn signs them and 
returns the signatures to the user. Details about authentication and signing 
pseudonyms are provided in Chapter 4. 
2. The user can authenticate to the traffic server using one of her signed pseudonyms. 
Note that users are capable to change pseudonyms from time to time and hence to 
divide their real trajectory into smaller trajectories. This in turn makes it hard to link 
different pseudonyms for the aim of constructing the complete trajectory.  
3. The traffic server verifies the signature of the Pseudonyms Signer and responds to 
the user accordingly. Verification of signature is done using the public key of 
pseudonyms signer. 
When a user requires signing new pseudonyms, she simply generates new 
pseudonyms and then applies again to the pseudonym signer. For security issues, 
pseudonyms are valid for a predefined lifetime and then expire.  
3.2 Pseudonym Signer 
The main idea of using a pseudonym signer is to gain anonymous access to traffic 
server similar to that used in VANETs designs. To accomplish this task, a pseudonym 
signer should have the following properties: 
 Requires registration  
 Enables Revocation for misbehaving users 
 Have a back door for identity revealing under law enforcement purposes 
 Preserves privacy and distribute trust among different entities. 
Registration is required for determining legitimate users and for other purposes such 
as billing of services provided to users. It is also required for restricting the use of the 
service to legitimate users only. Revocation is required for preventing misbehaving users 
from continuing using the services. CTM systems are related to cases where liability may 
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be required; these cases include road accidents, robbery, etc. In these cases there might be 
some need for revealing real identity for law enforcement purposes. On the other hand, an 
adversary should not be able to link a particular pseudonym to a particular user, she also 
should not be able to link pseudonyms used by a particular user. Details about the design 
and properties of pseudonym signer are provided in Chapter 4. 
3.3 Design of Location Update and Changing Pseudonyms  
This stage aims to leverage privacy of users by enhancing the privacy level of their 
location data.  Location information is sensitive and may reveal important information 
about users. The decision of when to change a pseudonym is very important and may 
significantly enhance privacy. Changing a pseudonym with other k users at the same time 
and region reduces the probability of linking old and new pseudonyms together, this in turn 
enhances privacy of users who have changed pseudonyms together. In VANETs, the region 
where vehicles change pseudonyms together is called a mix zone. Mix zones in VANETs 
depend on a trusted third party to establish these zones and distribute them to users.  
In existing infrastructures, the privacy is enhanced by cloaking techniques, these 
techniques guarantee k-anonymity level, however they depend on trusted third parties for 
determining the cloaking region or time.  
In our PA-CTM, we propose a design of a pseudonym change mechanism that 
behaves similar to mix zones in VANETs and leverage privacy of users. It also triggers a 
location update according to local parameters (speed and direction) and does not rely on a 
trusted third party. 
3.4 Summary  
In this chapter, we provided an introduction of our proposed PA-CTM. In the next 
chapter, we give detailed explanation of our collusion resistant pseudonym providing 
system, CoRPPS that will be used in building our privacy aware collaborative traffic 
monitoring system.  
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4. COLLUSION RESISTANT PSEUDONYM PROVIDING SYSTEM 
In this Chapter, we provide the details of our Collusion Resistant Pseudonym 
Providing System, CoRPPS. These details include detailed design and flow, properties of 
CoRPPS including identity revealing for liability and revocation of misbehaving users, and 
resistance against attacks including collusion among entities and among users as well. 
4.1 Introduction  
As discussed in [13,14], the lack of privacy is the main hindrance for the success of a 
service providing system that requires user authentication. This encouraged service 
providers to develop a privacy preserving system that protects users’ privacy. Most of these 
systems depend on the usage of temporary identities instead of real identities. These 
temporary identities are called pseudonyms [50]. 
Anonymous access systems, such as Tor [63] , and Crowds [64], allow users to 
connect anonymously to service providers by rerouting traffic through a number of network 
servers. Some service providers require the possibility of denying the service for abusive 
users. Using such anonymous access systems would cause denying the service to legitimate 
users as well. Thus there is a necessity for anonymous access systems with the possibility 
of revoking abusive users only.  
Access control and revocation rules differ from one service provider to another 
according to the nature of the service provided. Some providers need only to revoke 
abusive users without revealing their real identities. Some requires revealing the real 
identity of the current pseudonyms without looking for the past pseudonyms (i.e. previous 
anonymity is guaranteed). In other applications such as traffic monitoring systems, current 
and part of previous anonymity revealing may be necessary due to law enforcement 
reasons. 
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Different anonymous access systems with different properties have been proposed in 
the literature [65,66]. These systems are either punitive [65] in a way they completely 
reveal previous anonymity, or restrictive [43] in a way that they only revoke future access 
without revealing real identities. Most of these systems, as [39,67], have been designed for 
a specific service provider and may not suit other services. Another drawback is that all 
systems that enforce identity revealing rely on a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to reveal the 
real identity. Misbehavior and/or collusion of TTP may lead to a severe privacy leakage, 
which has not been addressed adequately in the existing schemes.  
In this chapter, we propose the design details of our Collusion Resistant Pseudonym 
Providing System, CoRPPS [15, 16], a novel pseudonym providing system. CoRPPS 
distributes trust among all system parties and resists against collusion among them to reveal 
the real identities of the users.  In this way, CoRPPS ensures a level of anonymity for users 
served by a particular service provider. It also enables linking a particular pseudonym to its 
real identity for liability reasons only. Identity revealing is fair and does not reveal services 
other than the required case. By the term liability we mean disclosing real identity for law 
enforcement purposes in cases such as road accidents, robbery, etc. To the best of our 
knowledge, CoRPPS is the first work in pseudonym systems that address flexibility, 
identity revealing fairness, and collusion among all type of system parties. CoRPPS is 
flexible such that it fit into different services by adjusting its parameters..  
4.2 CoRPPS Design  
As a pseudonym providing system, CoRPPS should have the following properties 
that are required for such systems: 
 Registration 
 Revocation of misbehaving users 
 Identity revealing for law enforcement purposes 
 Privacy preserving and distributed trust  
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These properties are crucial for a pseudonyms providing system. The success of such 
systems relies heavily on these properties. In addition to these properties, we added a new 
feature to our design; this feature is flexibility. Flexibility means that CoRPPS can fit 
different application including traffic monitoring system; details about flexibility are 
provided in Section 4.6.1. According to the above mentioned properties, we design 
CoRPPS to be composed of the five functional units listed below: 
1. Registration Authority,   : RA is responsible for the process of users’ registration. 
2. Users: In our Privacy Aware Collaborative Traffic Monitoring, PA-CTM, users are 
vehicles that are subscribed to the system and have the rights to use it. It does worth 
mentioning here that CoRPPS is a multipurpose system that can be tuned for 
different service providers including traffic monitoring. 
3. Authentication Servers,   s:  The aim of using multiple   s is to split user 
authentication among a group of authentication servers. This in turn prevents a 
particular authentication server from being able to link a temporary identity to a 
particular user.  
4. Pseudonym Signer,   :     signs user’s pseudonyms using her private key. This 
signature can be verified later by the Service Provider using the public key of   . 
5. Service Provider,   :  In PA-CTM,    is the traffic monitoring system.    can 
check the legitimacy of a pseudonym by verifying the signature of    using   ’s 
public key. 
These units (shown in Figure 5) communicate together to form the general flow of 
CoRPPS. The process of putting CoRPPS into operation requires the execution of the 
following steps; these steps are detailed in Section 4.5 and are shown in Figure 5 as well.    
1. Initial setup: The aim of this stage is to prepare CoRPPS units for registering users 
and providing services to them.  
2. Registration: Users register to the registration authority using their identification 
information  
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3. Authentication and ticket acquisition: Users apply to a predetermined number of 
authentication servers,   s, to get tickets4. These tickets are used by pseudonym 
signer to check the legitimacy of the pseudonyms signing request. 
4. Signing pseudonyms: users send tickets and a set of pseudonyms to pseudonyms 
signer who in turn verifies the correctness of the tickets and sign pseudonyms. 
5. Using the service: Users use the service by authenticating themselves using their 
signed pseudonyms. Service provider verifies the signature of pseudonym signer 
over these pseudonyms and proceeds with request accordingly. 
 
Figure 6: CoRPPS design 
4.3 Assumptions and Threat Model 
In CoRPPS design, we assume that all communications among CoRPPS entities are 
secured using SSL (Secure Socket Layer) or another transport layer security protocol.  
The Pseudonym Signer,   , has a public-private key pair and uses this to sign 
pseudonyms. The Service Provider,   , knows the public key of   .  
                                                 
4 A ticket can generally be described as hidden information to be sent to pseudonym signer 
through the user. A more detailed description is provided in Section 4.4.4. 
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Users are assumed to be semi-honest such that they follow the protocols properly and 
do not block the continuity of CoRPPS; however, they are curious and try to link 
pseudonyms to the real identities of particular users. 
On top of this curiosity, parties may collude by exchanging secret or critical 
information that they possess in order to reveal real identities of pseudonyms, and hence try 
to breach privacy of a pseudonym’s holder. Collusion may occur between any two or more 
parties of CoRPPS except users who are assumed to collude only together. 
The security of CoRPPS does not depend on an ultimately trusted entity. Instead the 
trust is split among multiple entities and our design resists against collusion among them.  
It is a general requirement for most pseudonym system to have a backdoor for 
identity revealing to be used by law enforcement units when needed for legal and liability 
cases. CoRPPS also supports this feature. Actually such a feature contradicts with user 
privacy, so a careful design is needed. In our CoRPPS design, in order to maximize the 
privacy of the users, all trusted system entities must collaborate together in order to reveal 
the real identity of a user who used a particular service. In other words, collusion among all 
trusted entities is not considered as a threat, and this fact is by design.  
4.4 CoRPPS Basic Building Blocks  
The basic building blocks of CoRPPS are tokens and token pool, counter, verification 
code, tickets, and pseudonyms. The following subsections provide detailed information 
about each of them.   
4.4.1 Tokens and Token Pool 
Tokens are temporary anonymous identifiers which help    to verify that a user is a 
genuine user. Tokens are generated by the registration authority,   , to be used by the 
authentication servers,   s, to generate users’ tickets.    generates a token pool at the 
setup phase and sends this pool to all   s, and to the pseudonym signer,   .   s use the 
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token pool to randomly select a token with replacement and use it to generate the users’ 
tickets as described in Section 4.5.3.  
The random token selection process is with replacement, meaning that a particular 
token can be used several times for the same or different users; this is one of the main 
enablers of anonymity in our system. On the other hand,    uses the token pool to validate 
the process of signing users’ pseudonyms. New token pool is to be generated when 
CoRPPS collision probability exceeds a threshold; for more details about collision 
probability, please refer to Chapter 5.  
4.4.2 Counter 
In CoRPPS, a particular user is assigned a group of Authentications Servers,   s, 
during registration and she always talks to this group of   s to obtain tickets. A particular 
user   and her corresponding group of   s maintain a synchronized counter,     .      
holds the number of times the user    has applied to   s for tickets (i.e. it is a session 
counter). Hence it is incremented in both   s side and user side when the user    gets her 
tickets. 
      is limited by the value        in order to enforce the users to use the system 
efficiently and fairly. Once users consume their counter values, CoRPPS must be restarted 
with new token pool and the counter values of all users are set to 0.      is used to 
calculate the verification code and its main function is to have a different verification codes 
for the same user at each session. This is very important to provide unlinkability among 
different sessions. 
4.4.3 Verification Code  
Verification code,  , is a value calculated at each authentication server whenever a 
user applies for tickets. This code is unique for a particular user,    , a particular group, 
    , and a particular     . Each time user   applies to an     for a ticket,    calculates  
  as                                  ,where     is the identity of the user,      is 
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the current counter value of user  ,      is the group identity of the   s corresponding to 
that user, and      is the upper bound of   values. 
In setup phase, authentication servers,   s, are organized by registration authority 
into groups of     s per group. Each group is given an identity called group identity,    .  
Then, in registration phase, users are distributed among these groups and each user is only 
allowed to apply to her assigned group of   s,     . All   s of the same group generate 
the same verification code,  , for the same user identity,    , and the same counter value 
of that user,     .    uses   to generate the ticket that will be sent to the applying user. 
Pseudonym signer,   , uses   to verify that the received   tickets from a particular user 
actually belong to this user, if these tickets bear the same   values.   
4.4.4 Tickets 
Tickets are pieces of encrypted information generated by authentication servers,   s, 
and sent to the Pseudonyms Signer,   , through the user. Tickets are encrypted using a 
symmetric encryption key   shared between    and   s. A ticket is generated by an    as 
               , where   is a randomly selected token from token pool, and   is the 
corresponding verification code. Tickets are used by    to check that tokens are valid and 
that tickets have the same verification code, which means that they are generated for the 
same user with the same counter value. The aim of encryption is to hide the ticket content 
from users so that they cannot misuse this information to cheat on the system via collusion 
among themselves.  
Tickets are used by    to check that tokens are valid and that tickets have the same 
verification code, which means that they are generated for the same user with the same 
counter value. 
4.4.5 Pseudonyms  
Pseudonyms are temporary identities used by users to apply to the service provider 
for a service. Users generate pseudonyms as random values and send them to the 
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Pseudonym Signer,   , at which they are signed. After that, the user submits a signed 
pseudonym to apply for a service. In the notations, we use   
  to denote the ith pseudonym of 
user  . Although, the notation implies that the user identity and ordering information is in 
the pseudonym structure, it is actually not the fact. User and order information is used in the 
notation for the sake of clarity of the explanation. Actually, the pseudonyms are random 
values and do not carry any user information in themselves. Moreover they do not follow a 
particular sequence. Otherwise, a particular user’s pseudonyms may be linked according to 
that sequence which may cause a dangerous privacy breach.  
4.5 CoRPPS Flow 
In this subsection, we explain, in detail, all five stages shown in Figure 5 (initial 
setup, registration, authentication and ticket acquisition, signing pseudonyms, and using the 
service). These stages form the entire flow of CoRPPS and achieve the aim of CoRPPS 
design, i.e. providing pseudonyms while maintaining a high level of resistance against 
collusion attacks. 
4.5.1 Initial Setup 
The main role of this stage is carried out by the registration authority,   . This step is 
explained in Figure 6. During the initial setup,    generates a token pool and distributes it 
to all authentication servers,   s, and to the pseudonym signer,   . The size of the token 
pool is denoted by   .    groups   s in equally sized groups. The size of a each group is 
denoted by  . Selection of   value is a tradeoff which is going to be discussed in Chapter 5. 
The total number of groups is simply calculated as     
 
 .  
Each group is given a group identity    . This identity is sent to the corresponding 
  s to be used in later stages of CoRPPS. The main benefit of grouping is to provide the 
resistance against collusion among   s, as will be discussed later. Note that a particular    
may belong to more than one group, and hence may own different     values for different 
groups it belongs to.  
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The final step in CoRPPS setup is generating a symmetric encryption key   by    
and sending it to all   s and to pseudonym signer.   is used to encrypt and decrypt tickets 
between   s and   . In the setup phase all the exchanges are assumed to be performed 
over secure offline channels 
 
Figure 7: Initial setup 
4.5.2 Registration  
Each user in CoRPPS is to be registered before getting the pseudonyms signed and 
using the services. The main task in registration is to specify the group of   s with which a 
particular user interacts and make the necessary setup for these interactions. These steps for 
user registration are shown in Figure 7.  
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Figure 8: Registration 
For a user to register in CoRPPS, she first sends her real identification information 
to   .   , then, generates a random identity,     and   passwords, one for each    in the 
group, for that user, and sends them back to her. The identity     has been selected 
randomly and does not include any indication about the real identity of the user; thus, 
disclosure of     does not cause revealing the real identity.  
For user  ,    generates   distinct passwords, denoted as    
  , each of the is to be 
shared between user   and an    in her group.  These passwords are needed for the 
challenge-response authentication protocol between   s and the user before the ticket 
generation process, as will be discussed in Section 4.5.3.  
Moreover,    assigns the user   to a particular group of   s selected randomly from 
the available groups established in the setup phase. Later    sends    , the user’s group 
identity,     , and    
   to the corresponding   s.    also sends the user the identities of 
  s that belong to the user’s assigned group. This would enable the user to communicate 
with her assigned   s and would enable the corresponding   s to authenticate that user 
using her     and    
  .  
Note that   s other than group members are not able to authenticate the user because 
they do not possess     and    
  , and each    in a particular group has a different shared 
   
   for the same user  .  
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   maintains records of user identities,     , the identities of   s assigned to that 
group,     , and the group identities of the users,     . These records are used for 
revocation and identity revealing which are going to be discussed in Sections 4.6.2 and 
4.6.3 respectively.   
4.5.3 Authentication and Ticket Generation 
Once the user registers, she can apply to her group of   s to get authenticated and 
obtain tickets, which, in turn, are used to obtain signed pseudonyms. A user can run this 
process several times during her lifetime; however in this section, a single run of the 
process is detailed. Figure 8 shows the complete authentication and ticket generation stage.  
 
Figure 9: Authentication and ticket generation 
The user   sends her    , and      to all authentication servers,   s, belonging to 
her assigned group,      . Each of the   s in the group authenticates the user using a 
simple challenge-response protocol by first checking    , and then sending a random 
challenge,   , to the user. The user calculates her response                  
    and 
sends it back to the authenticating   . This    also calculates the response and compares 
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the received response with the calculated one; if they are equal, then the user is 
authenticated.  
After the authentication,    validates     value by simply comparing the     value 
sent by user with its      value; they should be equal. After the successful authentication 
and      validation, each    first calculates the verification code, 
                                . Then,    selects a token,  , from token pool 
randomly and with replacement in order to generate a                . The ticket is sent 
to the user. Since there are     s in a group, the user receives   tickets that will be used to 
get her pseudonyms signed by the pseudonym signer,   . After the ticket generation, 
counter values of the user and the corresponding   s are incremented by one.  
Each    keeps the records of (   ,       ) pairs for all issued tickets. These records 
are used for identity revealing and revocation purposes as will be detailed in Section 3.4. 
Since the tickets are encrypted with   and the users do not know it, ticket contents cannot 
be seen by the users. Moreover, tickets cannot be modified by the user either since if 
modified, decryption by the    in the next stage would not yield the correct      form.  
The use of token in this process is mainly to verify the legitimacy of the ticket owner. 
This verification will be done by   , as detailed in the next section. Moreover, it is 
worthwhile to note that this verification is done anonymously. Moreover, since the tokens 
are picked from the token pool randomly and with replacement, a particular token may be 
used for several users by the same   . This helps to provide unlinkability between the 
tickets and user identities,    s, even for the issuing   .  
The use of verification code further improves security of CoRPPS by associating the 
tickets to    s,    group identities and session counters. However, this association may 
work against unlinkability since it may also serve as a unique identifier to link a ticket to a 
user, for the issuing AS. Thus, we do not use the hash value entirely, but in modulo     , in 
order to increase the chance of using a particular token - verification code pair for more 
than one user by an   . 
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Last, but not the least, since we employ more than one   s in ticket generation 
process, we enforce collusion of several   s for an attack. In Chapter 5, we provide 
analyses of these security and anonymity related performance issues. 
4.5.4 Signing Pseudonyms 
In this stage, the user first generates a set of pseudonyms,   
    
      
 , and sends 
them to the pseudonym signer,   , along with g tickets she received from the authentication 
servers.    decrypts the tickets to obtain the tokens and the verification codes (for the sake 
of simplicity of the explanation, we denote the set of these tokens as   and the combination 
of (   ) as       ). This process is shown in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 10: Signing pseudonyms 
Verification codes in all tickets should be identical for a legitimate pseudonym 
signing request.   , firstly, makes this equality check. Moreover,    also checks whether 
the tokens are legitimate or not. This control is performed by checking whether these 
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tokens exist in the token pool, which the    obtained in the initial setup phase, or not.  If 
these two tests are successfully passed, then    checks whether or not it previously issued 
pseudonyms for another request with the same       , by searching its database of issued 
pseudonyms. If there is match, then the same set of tickets and verification code has been 
either used previously to obtain pseudonyms or there is an incidental collision. CoRPPS 
does not differentiate between these two cases; but, in either case,    rejects signing 
pseudonyms.  
At this point, the concept of        collision should be detailed. Since the tokens are 
selected randomly and with replacement from the token pool, and the verification code is 
calculated modulo     ; there is risk of having the same        value for two different 
pseudonym signing requests. Such an incident is called collision. If this is the case, then    
declines the pseudonym signing request as described above. Actually, the case of incidental 
collision causes confusion during the procedure of identity revealing for liability; i.e. the 
authorities cannot make sure who has used the pseudonyms. Fortunately, with a proper 
selection of CoRPPS parameters, the probability of collision can be extremely reduced as 
will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
In case of no collision,    signs all pseudonyms and send the signatures, 
(         
            
              
   , back to the user.    records user’s pseudonyms 
     
    
      
   associated with       to its database. This will enable    to reveal the 
tickets that are associated with a particular pseudonym for identity revealing or revocation 
purposes. 
4.5.5 Using the Service 
In order to use services, the user sends her          ,   
 , the signature of 
pseudonym signer,   , over that pseudonym,         
   , and the services she is willing to 
receive to the service provider,   .    verifies the signature of    over the user 
pseudonym using the public key of   . If the verification succeeds, then    provides the 
user with the required services. Figure 10 shows this process. 
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Figure 11: Using the service 
   maintains a database of services provided and pseudonyms. In each record of this 
database, the services provided and the pseudonym used to get these services are listed 
along with date, time and other relevant data  
4.6 CoRPPS’s Features  
In this subsection, we describe some extra features supported by CoRPPS. These 
features stem from the required characteristics and functionality that CoRPPS should 
provide as a pseudonym providing system. They include flexibility, identity revealing for 
liability, and pseudonym revocation.  
4.6.1 Flexibility 
By flexibility, we mean the possibility of using CoRPPS as a general anonymous 
access system for different services. Since service providing systems vary according to the 
nature of the service, the following CoRPPS parameters can be tuned to fit for a wider 
range of service providers: 
1. Maximum number of pseudonyms allowed to be signed in each session:       
2. The time period that unused signed pseudonyms are valid through:          
3. The lifetime of a pseudonym after its usage:          
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The choice of the abovementioned parameters depends on the privacy threats and the 
required privacy level. If the service relies on information that may lead to privacy leakage 
such as location information in location based services, then the parameter selection should 
reflect increased       and decreased          and         .  If the service does not 
maintain records of sensitive data, then        can be decreased and both          and 
         can be increased. 
4.6.2 Identity Revealing for Liability 
One of the main design criteria of CoRPPS is to achieve unlinkability between a 
pseudonym and the identity of its owner. However, law enforcement units may require to 
learn the identity of a pseudonym holder in case of a service abuse; a practical system 
should also support such an identity revealing for liability reasons. The proposed CoRPPS 
system has the ability to reveal the real identity of a particular user for law enforcement 
purposes. The process of revealing a real identity is carried out by collaboration among all 
CoRPPS trusted parties,   , all   s,    and   ; the user entities do not take part in this 
process. Figure 11 shows the steps of revealing a particular user identity.  
 
Figure 12: Identity revealing 
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In step (1), the service, for which the corresponding pseudonym is to be revealed, is 
sent to service provider,   .   , then, queries its database and returns the target 
pseudonym,    
 . In step (2),   
  is sent to the pseudonym signer,   , which returns the 
corresponding combination of tokens and the verification code,      , by searching its 
database. In step (3),       is sent to all authentication servers,   s, in the system. Each    
queries its database for the set of all user identities,     , to whom any combination of 
tokens and verification code,      , was given. The result,   , of each    ’s query is sent 
back to the identity revealing process. Actually, results from the group of   s that took part 
in generation of   
  would suffice, but the pseudonyms, tokens and the verification codes do 
not carry this information; thus, all   s are needed to be queried. To finish step (3), the 
identity revealing process takes the intersection   s for each group of   s (remember that 
  s are grouped in the setup phase; each group has     s and there are     
 
  groups). The 
intersection set for each group, denoted as    , is an empty set if the corresponding    
group has not been employed in the signing process of    
 . 
Finally, the union of all     sets are calculated to find out the candidate set of    s, 
denoted as   . The set    is, actually, the set of the user IDs for which real identities are 
to be revealed by   . In step (4),     is sent to   , which returns the real 
identity/identities of the user(s) in   , since    keeps the     – real identity mappings in 
its database. 
Normally, the set    should contain only one user identity (    in our case), if there 
is no collision. However, if there exists a collision, then the number of elements in    is 
greater than one, and consequently, more than one real identity is returned by    in step 
(4). Remember that collision occurs if two or more users are incidentally given the 
same       from their corresponding group   s. CoRPPS does not solve the ambiguity 
caused by collisions, but as we will discuss in Section 4.3, the probability of having a 
collision can be significantly reduced by selecting the parameters carefully. The reader 
should notice that that CoRPPS does not sign pseudonyms in presence of collision; the aim 
of reducing collision probability here is for the sake of network performance, not for 
security or privacy issues. 
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Let us give a relatively toy example for the identity revealing process. Assume that 
we have a CoRPPS system of         s grouped in       s/group. Therefore, the 
total number of groups is   
 
   . These groups are the sets of                 , 
                ,                 , and                  . These groups are 
assigned to some users and several tickets that contain tokens and verification codes are 
given to these users by the corresponding   s. The databases of   s at a certain time are 
shown in Table 1.  
Table 1: ASs’ tables of the example 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now assume that the identity revealing process has carried out steps (1), and (2), and 
received the value                      from   . To carry out step (3), each    queries 
its databases for     values matching any pair of                        . Each    sends 
a set    as its answer for this query. According to Table 1,            ,         , 
          , and         .  
After that, the identity revealing process intersects these    values, according to the 
AS groups, in order to calculate the candidate user ID sets,    , for each group. This 
process yields: 
                                       
             
    token V      token v 
1 t1 10  1 t2 10 
2 t1 10  2 t2 10 
3 t6 20  3 t2 11 
4 t1 10  5 t7 10 
5 t8 20  6 t8 20 
       
             
    token V      token v 
6 t2 10  6 t3 10 
1 t3 10  2 t5 10 
3 t3 20  3 t4 20 
4 t5 10  3 t5 11 
5 t3 10  5 t2 10 
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The aggregated candidate user identity set,   , is calculated as the union of these 
group     values:                       , which means that the target     
is 1. This value will be sent to    to get the corresponding real identity.        
Here the readers should notice that identity revealing process requires the 
collaboration of all trusted entities,   ,  ,all   s and   , of CoRPPS. It is clear that 
without the help of   ,    and   , we cannot learn necessary pieces of information of the 
process. However, one may argue that collusion among some   s, not all of them, may 
suffice since eventually only the   s of the group of     really helps in the process. 
However, a particular    cannot know other   s in a particular group; this information is 
only at   . Thus, collusion among some   s may help to find out     only 
probabilistically, which is analyzed in Section 4.7.  
4.6.3 Revocation 
Revocation is the process of stopping to provide service to a user. There could be 
several reasons to revoke a user, which are out of scope of this paper. In this section, we 
describe how a user is revoked in CoRPPS. To revoke a user, all his signed pseudonyms 
should be blocked from accessing a service. The process is shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 13: Revocation in CoRPPS 
In step (1),    sends the identity of the user,    , to be revoked to the group of 
authentication servers she is assigned to. These   s, respond by sending back a set of all 
tickets issued for    . These tickets are listed according to the order of their issuance. 
 Then, in step (2),    groups each   tickets of the same order of issuance together, 
decrypts them, and generates one       from each decrypted group of the   tickets. All 
     s are then grouped in a set called   .    contains all      s used by user   for 
signing pseudonyms.    then sends    to    and asks her to find out all pseudonyms 
signed for all        in    .    lists these pseudonyms in    , which is the set of 
revoked pseudonyms signed for a particular user  .  
Finally, in step (3),     sends     to the service provider,   .    updates her 
revocation list accordingly. Each time a user applies to    for a service,    checks the 
user’s pseudonym against the revocation list and then proceeds with the service if the 
provided pseudonym is not revoked. 
4.7 Resistance against Attacks 
In this section, we describe the level of CoRPPS’s resistance against collusion and 
data disclosure attacks mentioned in Section 4.3.  
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4.7.1 Resistance against Disclosure of Data 
The basic idea of CoRPPS design is to prevent the ability of linking a pseudonym to a 
particular user and hence to a particular service. This means that a particular party must not 
be able to combine both service and identity information. The effects of data disclosure of 
each entity are listed below. 
    contains user profiles and real identities, no information about pseudonyms or 
services can be known by   .  
    contains user identities and tickets provided to them, no information about 
pseudonyms or services is available. The number of involved   s in data disclosure 
affects the level of information they may gain together. This will be discussed in 
Section 4.  
    is not able to link the pseudonyms signed for users in different sessions since the 
tickets contain anonymous but verifiable information. Moreover,    does not know 
any information about users or services.  
     is able to link a particular service to a particular pseudonym; it is not possible 
for the     to link a pseudonym to a particular user. 
To summarize, in order to find out who has used a particular service, the chain of 
pseudonymsticketsUser identityReal identity must be followed and this is not 
possible without collusion of all trusted entities of CoRPPS. Partial collusions only cause 
partial problems but do not effectively reveal the real identity of a user who used particular 
service. A discussion about resistance against collusion among CoRPPS entities is given 
next. An analytical performance evaluation for the effect of partial collusion is given in 
Chapter 5. 
4.7.2 Resistance against Collusions among CoRPPS Entities 
Collusion is defined as “a secret agreement between two or more parties for a 
fraudulent, illegal, or deceitful purpose”. In our case, the attack of collusion among 
CoRPPS entities,   ,   s,    and   , aims at revealing the real identity of a user who 
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used a particular service. As described in Section 4.6.2, all of these entities must collude 
together (including all   s) in order to reveal the real identity for liability reasons. On the 
other hand, it is also possible to have partial collusions, in which some - but not all - of the 
entities collude. Here, we examine different scenarios of partial collusions between system 
parties and explain the resistance level of CoRPPS against them.  
The collusions between    –   s,    –   ,    –    and    –   s do not cause any 
problems since these entity pairs do not have a common information-base to yield the real 
identity of a user who used a service. Actually collusion among   ,   ,   s, and   , 
which is the legal identity revealing process described in Section 4.6.2, is a must for such 
an attack since the pseudonyms used to access a service is known by   , tickets used to 
sign a pseudonym is known by   , user identities,    s, corresponding to the tickets are 
known by   s, and real identity of an     is known by   . Although we mention in 
Section 4.6.2 that all   s must collaborate for guaranteed identity revealing, collusion 
among a subset of   s may probabilistically suffice as will be discussed now. 
Collusion between    and    yields the tickets used to obtain a pseudonym, which 
was used to access a service. Normally a particular    does not know the other   s in its 
groups. However, collusion among a subset of   s may cause to identify the groups of   
  s that issued the tickets of this pseudonym. This, in turn, causes to identify     and then 
the real identity with the help of   . As the number of colluding   s increases, the 
probability of the attack of linking pseudonyms to real identity increases. A detailed 
analysis of this collusion attack is given in Chapter 5. 
One may argue that threshold cryptosystems of ( ,   ) described in [76] may be 
used to enforce authentication with at least   out of      authentication servers. In ( ,   ) 
threshold cryptosystems, any subset of   authentication servers out of     servers can 
authenticate a particular user and provide her with the required tickets. However, in 
CoRPPS we enforce a particular user to communicate only with her corresponding group of 
  s. This secret mapping makes it harder for authentication servers to collude in the aim of 
revealing a particular group of users.      
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Collusion among   ,    and   s causes to run the identity revealing process to some 
extent such that     who used a particular service can be revealed. Although the real 
identities cannot be learned in this attack, since    is not colluding, running this attack 
several times helps to build a service transaction history for a particular    .  
CoRPPS allows the    to sign several pseudonyms in one session, i.e. for each   
valid tickets.  This feature can be slightly abused by    by colluding with   . In this way, 
they can learn that the pseudonyms generated in one session, which belong to one particular 
user, are used in certain services. Of course neither    nor    can link this information to 
an     or real identity. Moreover linking pseudonyms of different sessions is not possible.  
4.7.3 RA-AS-PS Trio Collusion 
A corrupt    may cooperate with a single    and the    to identify all pseudonyms 
by assigning the corrupt    to each group during the setup phase.  The corrupted    then 
replaces      in          with                 truncated or extended to the appropriate 
length. The    can then recognize these identifiers and associate a pseudonym with a 
particular user.  Since it is assumed that the encryption scheme is secure, no user will detect 
this attack. 
Fortunately, this attack can be understood by legitimate   s. The total number of   s 
(   ) and the number of   s per group ( ) are publicly known. Then it is easy to infer the 
expected number of groups assigned to each   .  Therefore,   s other than corrupted    in 
the mentioned attack can easily discover this attack by the significance decrease in the 
number of groups they are assigned to. For example, if we have a CoRPPS system of 
         s with       s per group, then the number of groups a particular    
belongs to equals 72. On the other hand, if we are having a particular    in each group, the 
number of groups per each of the other   s is only 8. 
A related argument could be to assign users to groups that have a particular    all the 
time. However, this time the number of users assigned to the corrupted    will be much 
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larger than the number of users assigned to legitimate   s. Thus, such an attack can be 
understood as well. 
4.7.4 Resistance against Collusions among CoRPPS Users 
Another attack is the collusion among two or more users in order to escape from 
liability. Remember that one of the features of CoRPPS is that real identities can be 
revealed by law enforcement units for a liability issue. In order to smoothly run this 
process, a particular user should obtain her tickets from her designated group of   s. In this 
attack, the cheater user exchanges some tickets with some other users and submits a mixed 
set of tickets to the    to obtain signed pseudonyms. In this way, the cheating user seems to 
obtain tickets from some   s other than her group of designated   s. This situation causes 
the identity revealing process to fail and, therefore, the cheater cannot be tracked down by 
law enforcement. However, in order to succeed, the cheater should submit tickets of other 
users that can be verified by   ; this is not so possible, as discussed below.  
For two colluding users, with known     and     , it is not possible to calculate 
verification code precisely. This is because they do not know the group ID,     , which is 
incorporated in the verification code calculation,                                 . 
Moreover, they cannot obtain   out of the tickets since the tickets are encrypted and the 
users do not know the encryption key  . However, it is still possible to exchange tickets 
and to have the same verification code with a probability of       , where      is the 
upper bound of the verification code values. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the typical value 
of      is 100; this means that the probability of successfully choosing a ticket of the same 
verification code is only 1%. Moreover, submitting another user's ticket to PS is a blind 
trial for the cheating user. The reason is that users exchanging the tickets cannot precisely 
determine that the exchanged tickets have the same verification code, because they do not 
know     .  
It is easy to discover such an attack by comparing the verification code of each ticket. 
Fortunately, it is also possible to identify the cheating users by careful selection of CoRPPS 
parameters. In a CoRPPS system of     s in each group, the best chance for a successful 
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attack is to use     tickets having the same verification code (i.e. generated for the same 
   ,     , and     ) and then try one ticket from another user. The     tickets alone 
may then help in revealing the identity of abusive user if we design CoRPPS to have a very 
low collision probability for        s. The process of identifying abusive users is 
summarized below: 
1.    detects this attack by testing verification codes and storing ticket combinations 
involved in each trial. 
2. If the number of trials exceeds a threshold,     reports    with trials and ticket 
combinations. 
3.    then runs  identity revealing process described in Section 4.6.2 for all 
combinations of     tickets in each trial. 
The resulting set of identities contains the abusive users, and due to the very low 
collision probability, the resulting set will contain very few user identities. Users in the set 
can then be investigated and abusive ones will be identified and then revoked.  
4.8 Summary  
In this chapter, we explained in details the design and flow of our Collusion Resistant 
Pseudonym Providing System, CoRPPS. We also explained the properties of CoRPPS and 
its resistance against attacks. In the next chapter, we will show the performance evaluation 
of CoRPPS with different metrics. 
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5.  PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS FOR CORPPS 
We provide detailed performance evaluation of CoRPPS in this section. These 
analyses cover different issues concerning anonymity and attack resistance. 
5.1 Anonymity Analysis 
Users apply to   s for        , and each    maintains records of user’s identity and 
her issued                     . A user’s     at a particular    becomes anonymous 
when that    issues the same ticket for other    s.  This means that an     is hidden 
among all other    s that have been issued the same        in   ’s records. In the 
literature,  -anonymity metric is widely used to describe the anonymity level; it refers to 
the state of being anonymous among other     objects [59]. In CoRPPS, a particular     
is  -anonymous at a particular    if there exist other        s in   ’s records with the 
same       . For a particular   , the    ’s anonymity level of that     is defined as the 
least number of    s that belong to that    and have been issued the same       . 
To generate a ticket,    calculates the verification code,  , and then picks a token ,  , 
randomly from the token pool. Both   and   are concatenated and then encrypted by  . The 
total number of distinct         is        , where     is the number of tokens in the 
token pool, and       is the upper limit of verification codes,  . The probability of reusing 
a particular ticket is              . The total number of trials performed by users to 
get a ticket from a particular    is            , where    is the total number of users 
and        is the upper limit of the users’ counter. 
The ticket reuse is the source of anonymity in each    . If we consider a ticket reuse 
as a success, we can model ticket generation process as a binomial experiment. The total 
number of trials             , and the probability of success              . The 
resulting binomial distribution is       .   
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We simulated the ticket generation process at a particular   , with total number of 
users    = 1000, maximum value of users’ counters       =1000, total number of tokens 
in token pool   =1000, and upper limit of verification code values     =100. For each 
ticket, we calculated the number of times it was issued,           .  Then we calculated the 
probability                            , where   is the total number of trials. Figure 13 
shows the results of both the simulation experiment and the fitted binomial 
distribution                           . 
 
Figure 14: Analytical and simulation results of ticket generation process 
As clearly seen in Figure 13, the binomial distribution fits well the ticket generation 
process. Therefore, the binomial inverse cumulative distribution function5 can be used to 
calculate the least number of occurrences of a particular       , which is the   value of the 
 -anonymity metric. The binomial inverse cumulative distribution returns   with a 
predefined confidence level,  . Table 2 shows  -anonymity levels with         . For 
         users, and   =1000 tokens,     , which means  -anonymity level of 71 is 
                                                 
5 The Binomial CDF is calculated as             
 
               , where k is the 
number of successes (in our case anonymity level), p is the probability of success, and n is 
the number of trials. The inverse of this function returns the k value for a particular 
probability           . 
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guaranteed with 0.999 confidence level.  Table 2 also shows that that the anonymity level is 
directly proportional to the number of users,   , and inversely proportional to the number 
of tokens,   , in token pool. However, these parameters have a negative effect on the 
collision probability as will be discussed in Section 5.3.  
Table 2: Anonymity level with            ,       =1000,     =100 
     
   1000    10000 
10000 71 2 
50000 432 30 
100000 904 71 
250000 2347 203 
500000 4783 432 
1000000 9692 904 
5.2 Analysis of Collusion Among ASs 
  s are grouped in groups of   members of total number of groups          
 
 , 
where     is the  number of   s in the system, and   is the number of   s in each group. 
Each user is assigned a particular group and should apply only to   s of that group. As a 
result, if the records stored at   s of a particular group is disclosed, then all tickets 
provided by those   s to users of the same group are disclosed as well. As discussed in 
Section 5.1, each    maintains a level of anonymity against the disclosure of its data. This 
anonymity is the guard of the users' privacy. As the number of colluding   s increases, the 
probability of revealing the tickets they issued to a particular user also increases. In this 
subsection, we study the effect of collusion among   s on the disclosure of arbitrary and 
particular groups, and hence the disclosure of the tickets issued for users belonging to these 
groups. 
5.2.1 Collusion among ASs for an arbitrary group disclosure 
As discussed previously, in CoRPPS, each user is assigned to a particular group of   
ASs. If   arbitrary   s collude together, then they will be able to reveal all ticket 
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combinations provided for users belonging to the group to which these   s are assigned. 
This attack does not apply to a particular group; since arbitrary   s collude in this attack, 
the disclosed group is also arbitrary.  
When more than     s collude, the total number of arbitrarily disclosed groups starts 
to increase. The number of arbitrarily disclosed groups by collusion among     s is 
calculated as          
 
 
   
  
        
 , where      is the number of colluding   s, 
and   is the number of   s per group. Table 3 shows         for a system of     
     s and        s in each group. As the number of colluding   s,  , increases, the 
number of disclosed groups,        , also increases. At least     s must collude to reveal 
an arbitrary group. Moreover, to reveal the entire groups, all   s must collude which makes 
the attack much more difficult. When     (half of the   s are colluding), then only 5 out 
of the 210 groups are revealed, i.e. only 2.38% of total groups. Even with 70% of all   s 
are colluding (    in our case), only 16.67% of all groups (35 out of 210) are revealed. 
This analysis shows that CoRPPS exhibits good resiliency against    collusion attacks. 
Table 3: Number of arbitrarily disclosed groups by collusion among   s 
          
4 1 
5 5 
6 15 
7 35 
8 70 
9 126 
10 210 
5.2.2 Collusion among ASs for a particular group disclosure 
The aim of this attack is to disclose the ticket combinations of the users that belong to 
a particular group. This is a more difficult task for the attacker than the one described in 
Section 5.2.1 because the attacker needs to know the exact   s of a particular group that a 
user belongs to and then she has to engage these   s into a collusive agreement. The fact is 
that the attacker does not have the knowledge-base about the groups to which a particular 
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   belongs without actually engaging it. Therefore, this attack has a probabilistic nature 
such that the attacker randomly deceives ASs for collusion and then check whether a 
particular group has been disclosed or not.  
Assuming that   represents the number of colluding   s of a particular user’s group. 
The probability of finding the other         s of that group,          , is calculated 
as                    
   
    , where     is the total number of   s in the system. 
Table 4 shows           for a system of          s and       s in each group. 
When none of the   s of a particular user’s group are colluding        , the 
probability of disclosing the entire group of that user is very small (0.00012). Moreover, the 
probability that a dishonest    finds other       s to collude in order to reveal a group is 
also small (0.00198). If two   s belonging to a user’s group have already colluded, then 
the probability of revealing other two   s, belonging to that group is only 0.01786, which 
is quite small. The analyses so far show that in the case of partial information about the   s 
belonging to a particular group, the probability of revealing the entire group is very small. 
In the worst case of given three already colluded   s, the probability of successfully 
revealing the other    is only 0.14286.  
Table 4: Probability of revealing a particular group when some   s have already 
colluded  
              
4 0.00012 
3 0.00198 
2 0.01786 
1 0.14286 
 
This probability,          , is inversely proportional to     and  . This fact is 
illustrated in Figure 14.  
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Figure 15: Effect of increasing the number of ASs on       (a) g=4 and (b)g=3 
As shown by Figure 14, when  increases,      decreases. Especially when two or 
more ASs need to collude (     ),      is negligible for        . Increase in   
means that more   s have to collude for compromising the entire targeted group. This 
provides extra resistance for larger   when the same amount of   s have already colluded, 
i.e. for same   values. For example, when    ,        for    , which corresponds 
the line with diamond in Figure 14a; and       for    , which correspınds to line 
with cross in Figure 14b. When we compare these two lines, we clearly see that larger   
has a significant advantage to provide collusion resistance.  
5.3 Collision Analysis 
As mentioned in Section 4.5.4, collision is defined as having the same tokens and 
verification code,        value, for two different pseudonym signing requests.    should 
detect collisions and reject signing pseudonyms for colliding requests. As the number of 
     s used for signing pseudonyms increases, the collision probability also increases. The 
collision probability is calculated as            
  
      
, where    is the expected number 
of previously used      s in signing pseudonyms,  and        is the total number of 
different      s in the system.  
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The number of different ticket combinations is calculated as              
  
    , where    is the number of tickets in ticket pool, g is the number of ASs in a group, 
and      is the maximum value of the verification code V. Each time a user applies to   , 
   is incremented by one in the absence of collision, or remains the same if collision 
occurs. On this basis,    is defined recursively in terms of the number of times,  , different 
users apply to    for signing pseudonyms as:  
                              , By substituting                  
              
     
      
  we get                    
     
      
 . And by putting 
   
      
        
 , we get                    .  
The later is a recurrence with basis        . By solving this recurrence using 
repeated substitutions we get 
                                 
          
   
  , and by substituting the 
value of    
      
        
  , we get                   
    , but             
  
      
 
and substituting EC gives us                
     
We performed simulations for the pseudonyms signing process, and calculated the 
collision probability for different values of users’ counters,     . For each     value, we 
generated the combinations,      s, and the probability of collision was calculated as the 
number of colliding requests, i.e. the requests with a previously used      , divided by the 
number of non-colliding ones. The collision probability values obtained via simulations and 
using analytical formulation given above are compared in Figure 15 with the total number 
of tokens   =200, maximum value of verification code     =20, total number of users 
  =100000, maximum value for users’ counters       =1000, and the number of   s in a 
group  =3.  
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Figure 16: Simulation-based and analytical collision probability (  =200,     =20, 
  =100000,       =1000, and  =3) 
Figure 15 clearly shows that collision probability fits well our analytical model, 
                  
    , where    
      
        
 . Table 5 shows the calculated 
           with different values of    and   , using the analytical model.  
Table 5: Collision probability using analytical model,    =1000,     =100 
  =3  =4 
   
      
1000 10000 1000 10000 
10000 5.98 10-4 5.99 10-7 2.39 10-
6
 
0 
50000 3.00 10-3 2.99 10-6 1.19 10-
5
 
0 
100000 6.00 10-3 5.99 10-6 2.39 10-
5
 
0 
250000 1.48 10-2 1.49 10-5 5.98 10-
5
 
0 
500000 2.95 10-2 2.99 10-5 1.19 10-
4
 
0 
1000000 5.81 10-2 5.99 10-5 2.39 10-
4
 
0 
From Table 5, we see that collision probability can be reduced tremendously with 
proper selection of parameters. As the number of users,   , increases, the probability of 
collision also increases. Moreover, as the number of tokens,   , in token pool increases, the 
probability of collision decreases significantly. In Section 5.1, we showed that as the 
number of tokens,   , in a key pool increases, the anonymity level at a particular    
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decreases. Therefore, the choice of    becomes a tradeoff between anonymity level and 
collision probability. Fortunately, it is possible to maintain the same level of anonymity 
while decreasing the collision probability by increasing the number of   s in a group,  . 
As   increases, the probability of collision decreases.  
5.4 Communication Complexity in CoRPPS 
To sign pseudonyms, a user has first to acquire   tickets from his assigned 
authentication servers. The she sends her generated pseudonyms with the acquired   tickets 
to the pseudonym signer for the purpose of signing them. In this section, we formulate the 
communication complexity for ticket acquisition and for pseudonym signing. Then, we will 
analyse this cost for a particular CoRPPS parameters. It is worth mentioning here that ticket 
acquisition and signing pseudonyms can be done offline. 
5.4.1 Formulation of Complexity for Tickets Acquisition 
To acquire tickets, a user runs authentication and ticket generation process described 
in Section 4.5.3   times, where   is the number of   s in each group. The length of the 
user’s identity,    , depends on the maximum number of users in the system      and 
equals          6  similarly, the size of the counter is equal to            . Thus the 
size of the data sent by a user to a particular authentication server equals           
           . The user will then receive a random challenge of size     and will respond to 
the challenge with user response of size    . 
A ticket is composed of a token and a verification code as described in Section 4.4.4. 
The length of the token depends on the size of the token pool,        and equals to 
            . Similarly, the length of the verification code is          , where      is the 
                                                 
6 Logarithms here are calculated to the base 2. 
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maximum possible value of the verification code  . Thus, the entire length of each ticket is 
                             
The size of data sent and received by a user for a ticket acquisition from a particular 
authentication server equals                                        . 
Since we have   authentication servers, then we will have 
                                         bits of traffic for the entire 
ticket acquisition process. 
5.4.2 Formulation of Complexity for Signing Pseudonyms only 
In CoRPPS, pseudonyms are public keys that are signed in batches of at most        
pseudonyms. The size of a pseudonym depends on the underlying algorithm used for the 
generation of these pseudonyms. Denoting the length of a pseudonym by   , then the user 
will have to send          bits for the pseudonyms and      bits for the tickets.  
Then the user will receive the signatures of pseudonym signer over these 
pseudonyms. The size of the signature depends on the size of the key of the algorithm used 
in signing. Assuming that    uses the same key length used by users to generate their 
pseudonyms, then the size of the signature becomes the same as the size of the pseudonym. 
Thus, the total number of bits for signing       pseudonyms is equal to          
            
5.4.3 Communication Complexity Analysis 
According to Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, the size of traffic required for acquisition of 
tickets and signing pseudonyms is equal to         . Assume that we have a CoRPPS 
system with typical values of            ,    ,       
  ,         , and 
           . Assume also we use RSA algorithm of 1024 bit key size, i.e.         
bits. And assume that we are using SHA1 hash algorithm of 160 bit hash length, then 
            bits. 
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Figure 16 shows the size of entire traffic required for ticket acquisition and signing 
pseudonyms for different number of pseudonym,      , in each trial. 
 
Figure 17: Size of traffic vs. number of signed pseudonyms 
As seen from Figure 16, the size of traffic is linear with respect to the number of 
signed pseudonyms. When the user needs to sign 20 pseudonyms, then the traffic size is 
about 5.14 kilobytes. For 50 pseudonyms, the user requires 12.64 kilobytes which is an 
acceptable amount of traffic. 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we provided the performance evaluation of our collusion resistant 
pseudonym providing system, CoRPPS. Evaluation was based on different metrics 
including anonymity, collusion resistance, and collision probability. CoRPPS performed 
well under these metrics and hence we will use it as the pseudonym signer for our privacy 
aware collaborative traffic monitoring system, PA-CTM that will be explained in the next 
chapter. 
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6. PRIVACY AWARE COLLABORATIVE TRAFFIC MONITORING 
SYSTEM USING AUTONOMOUS LOCATION UPDATE MECHANISM  
Collaborative Traffic Monitoring (CTM) systems exploit the location information 
continuously collected from vehicles. Location data is very sensitive information that made 
privacy a major obstacle for the widespread usage of CTM systems. The way how this data 
is generated and used is very important for users’ privacy and data quality as well. 
Recently, two CTM approaches have been proposed, the first relies on a dedicated 
infrastructure which is called Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs), and the second 
utilizes the existing underlying infrastructure such as cellular and wireless networks. In this 
chapter, we propose our Privacy Aware Collaborative Traffic Monitoring System (PA-
CTM) that considers the privacy and security properties of VANETs and existing 
infrastructures. PA-CTM provides a client server architecture that relies on existing 
infrastructures and enhances privacy firstly by using a robust pseudonym providing system 
for anonymous access called CoRPPS, which was detailed in Chapter 4. And secondly by 
utilizing a novel Autonomous Location Update Mechanism (ALUM) that does not rely on a 
Trusted Third Party and uses only local parameters (speed and direction) for triggering a 
location update or pseudonym change. Our performance results showed that ALUM is 
effective for traffic monitoring in terms of both privacy and utility.  
6.1 Introduction  
Traffic monitoring systems have evolved rapidly in the last years due to the advances 
in communication technologies such as GPS, GSM and 3G networks. The main idea behind 
Collaborative Traffic Monitoring (CTM) systems is that users provide their location 
information to a server, in return they can benefit from the system such as viewing current 
traffic status in a particular region. CTM systems are critical nowadays especially in big 
cities with heavy and sometimes unpredictable traffic. Widespread usage of CTM systems 
would alleviate the congestion by proposing alternative routes to users and hence avoid 
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more vehicles entering the congested areas. In this way, CTM systems would save time and 
money, and more importantly decrease carbon emission by optimizing the traffic [68].  
The provision of the user’s exact location leads to privacy leakage problems because 
users may be identified using their locations. Moreover, they may be profiled according to 
their favorite locations; hence, they may be a target of different spam messages. Despite the 
fact that these systems use anonymous identities for users, they may still be traced and 
identified using some data mining techniques [34].  
CTM systems are divided into two major disciplines according to the underlying 
technology. The first one is based on the usage of Dedicated Short Range Communication 
(DSRC) that supports both Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) 
communications [28]. We name these as Dedicated Infrastructure (DI) Systems.  The 
second discipline is the utilization of existing underlying infrastructure such as cellular and 
wireless networks to set up an Intelligent Transportation System (ITS). The architecture is a 
client server architecture where clients send their location information to a server and get a 
complete overview of traffic from the server. We name these systems as Existing 
Infrastructure (EI) systems.  
DI approach requires deployment of dedicated infrastructure that is costly and needs 
time as well. On the other hand, EI approach utilizes existing communication infrastructure, 
and does not require new deployments, however it does not support anonymous access 
using pseudonyms. In EI approach, location privacy preserving techniques depend on a 
trusted third party and degrades the data quality as well. We develop a privacy aware 
collaborative traffic monitoring system, PA-CTM, that is based on EI and allow 
anonymous access using pseudonyms. Our PA-CTM relies on local parameters – NOT on a 
trusted third party, TTP - for triggering location updates and changing pseudonyms. PA-
CTM also reduces communication cost compared to other periodic location updates used in  
EI systems.  
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6.2 Background 
Here we discuss the requirements of a location update mechanism. Then we present 
the moving object model that we will use in our notations. 
6.2.1 Requirements of a Location Update Mechanism 
From the flaws of existing location update mechanisms described in Section 2.4, we 
find that any update mechanism should:  
 Catch all traffic irregularities that may appear  
 Be non periodic  
 Not depend on a Trusted Third Party (TTP).  
The third condition implies that moving objects should decide by themselves whether 
to update or not without communicating with other moving objects or parties. Fortunately, 
we can achieve such a method by utilizing the existence of traffic laws and regulations that 
drivers are enforced to follow for the purpose of a safe driving. 
6.2.2 Moving Object Data Model 
Sistla et al [69] proposed a data model for representing moving objects in database 
management systems called Moving Objects Spatio-Temporal (MOST) data model.  
According to MOST, a moving object   is modeled by three attributes,        , 
             and           . The       attribute represents the current position of 
object  ,            represents the time at which         was updated, and finally 
         (speed) is a function of time that describes the future       of object  , i.e. 
           is used to calculate future        s. If                    and 
                             at                , then                is 
calculated as                                               . i.e. A.function is 
used to calculate the expected location of object   using its last observed            
attribute and the elapsed time. Note that            represents the speed of a moving 
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object when we model traffic. The use of            instead of speed is for generalization 
purposes. 
6.2.3 Changing pseudonyms 
To enhance privacy in CTM systems, users use temporary identities called 
pseudonyms instead of using their real identities [30]. The use of pseudonyms enables 
hiding the real identity of users. However, it has been showed that even when using 
pseudonyms, it may be possible to reveal the real identity of some users by their location 
information [70]. 
To overcome this flaw, users are asked to change their pseudonyms from time to 
time. Changing pseudonyms makes it difficult to link pseudonyms together in the aim to 
build partial or even complete trajectory of the moving object. This in turn enhances the 
privacy level of users. However, pseudonym change is of no use if very few users do this 
change. Few users means higher probability of linking corresponding pseudonyms 
successfully.  
A proposed solution called mix zone has been provided [29,31]. Mix zones are 
regions where many users are expected to exist such as traffic lights or road intersections. 
Users are asked to change their pseudonyms inside these Mix zones so that new 
pseudonyms are mixed together. This will increase the privacy level and will make it 
difficult for an adversary to link two successive pseudonyms correctly. 
6.3 PA-CTM architecture and flow 
PA-CTM utilizes a client server architecture; users first sign their pseudonyms and 
then use the signed pseudonyms to authenticate to the traffic server for either updating their 
location information or querying current traffic status. The traffic server collects location 
information from different users (identified by pseudonyms) and provides users with 
current traffic status. Figure 17 shows the general architecture of our PA-CTM system. 
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Figure 18: PA-CTM architecture and flow 
The flow of our PA-CTM is shown on Figure 17. Firstly, step 1, the moving object 
generates a number of temporary identities called pseudonyms, and then she sends these 
pseudonyms to the pseudonym signer who in turn signs them and returns the signatures to 
the moving object. Then, step 2, the moving object can be authenticated to the traffic server 
using one of her signed pseudonyms. Note that users are capable to change pseudonyms 
from time to time and hence to divide their real trajectory into smaller trajectories identified 
by their pseudonyms. This in turn makes it hard to link different pseudonyms in the aim of 
constructing the complete trajectory. In step 3, the traffic server verifies the signature of the 
Pseudonyms Signer and responds to the moving object accordingly.  
The Pseudonym Signer is responsible for registering users and signing their 
pseudonyms. Our PA-CTM adopts a pseudonym providing system called Collusion 
Resistant Pseudonym Providing System (CoRPPS) that was detailed in Chapter 4 [15].  
6.4 Autonomous Location Update Mechanism, ALUM, Design  
When analyzing traffic flow, we can easily expect driver’s behavior, and hence the 
moving object’s behavior, according to traffic conditions.  Moving objects tend to behave 
similar under similar traffic conditions, thanks to traffic regulation laws.  If drivers face an 
obstacle they immediately reduce their speed and may be direction to avoid that obstacle. 
The same is applied when they face congestion; they tend to avoid that congestion by 
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changing their direction to another path. This unified behavior is illustrated in Figure 18 
which shows a part of a two sided road with lanes T1 and T2.  
In Figure 18, An accident occurred at T2 that caused a block of T2’s track. Moving 
objects through T2 track will reduce their speed and try to pass by T1 when they got an 
opportunity to do that. At the same time, moving objects at T1 will consider the accident 
and reduce their speed to bypass the accident region safely even though their track, T1, is 
clear. This unified behavior of all drivers can be utilized to investigate traffic conditions at 
different regions. 
ALUM relies on the fact that under similar traffic conditions, moving objects will 
behave similar. Hence ALUM triggers location update and pseudonym change if a change 
of a particular moving object’s behavior occurs. It assumes that all moving object at that 
region will also update their locations and change their pseudonyms because they will face 
the same traffic condition, and hence they are expected to behave similarly. Given that a 
moving object   has two successive location updates at          and         . Then 
these two updates must achieve 
1.                                    , or  
2.                           
We adopted the notations of Sistla et al. in [69],            reflects the speed of 
object A at a particular time stamp. In 1, if the difference between the (            , 
           ) is greater than a predefined threshold,          , then an update and a 
Figure 19: Illustration of unified drivers’ behavior 
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pseudonyms change are required. This means that   has changed its speed dramatically, in 
other words the acceleration or deceleration (both terms are used interchangeably) is high. 
The selection of the best threshold value is essential for ALUM to work efficiently, the 
details on the choice of          are provided in Section 7.2.  
Condition 2 examines the change in the direction of   and triggers an update and a 
pseudonym change if this value has changed to any of the other 7 direction values (namely, 
SS, EE, WW, NN, SE, SW, NE, and NW). Direction values are relaxed into 8 values as 
shown in Figure 19.  The relaxation is important to avoid frequent changes of directions for 
changing tracks or bypassing other moving objects. 
 
Figure 20: Direction relaxed values 
If 1 and 2 are not met, the moving object is assumed not to update. However this non-
update period may last for long. To avoid this, moving objects are triggered to update their 
location and optionally change their pseudonyms after a period of time randomly generated 
from a predefined interval [0:     ], where       is the maximum time allowed to wait 
before the next location update occurs. If conditions 1 and 2 are not met, then the moving 
object   picks a random value   from an interval of [0,      ] and  waits for time   to 
update her location. Note that   may update her location and change her pseudonym before 
  is consumed if conditions 1 or 2 are met again.  
Unlike virtual trip lines, VTL, described in [25], ALUM does not need a trusted third 
party to decide when to update. And by using a random period to update, ALUM does not 
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maintain a regular update pattern which makes linking of location updates more difficult. 
Because of its ability to capture changes in moving objects’ behaviors, ALUM ensures 
capturing all non regular traffic conditions. This strengthens ALUM against random silent 
period’s mechanism.  
ALUM is expected to reduce the communication cost due to the reduced number of 
required updates compared with periodical update mechanism. More details about 
communication costs are given in Section 7.6.3. 
Under regular traffic conditions, users update their locations according to silent 
period mechanism. They are also free to change their pseudonyms in these cases too. This 
will enable users to adjust their required privacy level against traffic server according to 
their preferences. 
6.5 Enhanced Autonomous Location Update Mechanism, EALUM 
In ALUM, if no significant speed variation or direction change occurs then location 
update is done after a random period of time. This update may affect privacy level if it was 
performed in regions of a very low traffic activity. Different regions have different traffic 
weights according to their traffic activity. For traffic monitoring and privacy concerns, 
these regions should not be treated equally; the higher the weight of a region the greater the 
effect of that region on traffic monitoring and on privacy as well. 
Privacy in ALUM can be enhanced by considering traffic weights. When ALUM is to 
update according to the silent period condition, it first checks the weight of her sub region. 
If the weight is greater than a predefined weight,        , then update is performed. 
Otherwise, update is delayed for another silent period. We call this mechanism Enhanced 
ALUM, or shortly EALUM. 
According to Hoh et al [24], determining the weights of sub regions can be done by 
dividing the total region into sub regions. Traffic is monitored for a relatively long period 
of time over that region. The weight of each sub region is then calculated as the number of 
updates generated in that sub region divided by the total number of location updates 
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performed in the total region; the higher the weight of a sub region, the larger the 
probability of having more vehicles in vicinity. This will positively affect the k-anonymity 
level and will reduce the linking probability of two pseudonyms as well. 
6.6 Properties of ALUM and EALUM  
ALUM enhances privacy of users by enforcing them to change their pseudonyms 
upon speed or direction change, which in turn forms a mix zone. Changing of pseudonyms 
in mix zones makes it difficult to link two pseudonyms of the same user. Applying ALUM 
or EALUM also increases the anonymity level by enforcing all users in vicinity to update 
their locations.  
ALUM and EALUM does not update location periodically, hence the data quality 
will be less than that of periodic update mechanism. But for traffic monitoring purposes, 
many periodic updates carry the same information and do not enhance traffic monitoring. 
This explains the capability of ALUM data to fit very well for traffic monitoring purposes 
as will be shown in Chapter 7. 
ALUM and EALUM are expected to reduce the communication cost due to the 
reduced number of required updates compared with periodical update mechanism. This in 
turn will increase the users’ turnout to PA-CTM due to lower communication costs. 
6.7 Privacy and Location Prediction Accuracy 
Privacy in location based service refers to the state of protecting users’ information 
from being disclosed. It also includes the information gained by applying data mining tools 
on location information. Possible data mining attacks include users’ profiling and tracking 
[72]. In this section we describe how can location data be privacy invasive, we also present 
an error model that is assumed to enhance privacy. 
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6.7.1 Privacy invasion via location prediction 
Location data points contain sensitive information that may lead to partial or 
complete disclosure of the user’s trajectory that may lead to the disclosure of the real 
identity of that user. Two or more location updates can be linked using the speed at the 
previous location and the expected travel time. To calculate the next expected moving 
object location,              , from current object location,           , we use 
                                           The precision of the result 
depends on how far this result from the actual location, we will use the term prediction 
accuracy to refer to the difference between expected and actual location.   
To exactly link two location updates together, one should be aware of prediction 
accuracy. Low prediction accuracy means greater difference between actual and expected 
location, and hence low precision about the exact next location. Because of prediction 
accuracy an adversary needs to try different linking possibilities of all other location 
updates that occur within the range of prediction accuracy, the area that covers this range is 
called Uncertainties Region,   . As the prediction accuracy decreases,    increases, and 
hence the probability of having more location updates inside    increases. This in turn is 
expected to enhance the privacy level of moving objects. 
There are different factors affecting prediction accuracy, they stem from different 
sources of errors in calculating the next expected location. These factors are combined 
together to form an error model that can be used for linking location updates. This model is 
detailed in Section 6.7.2.  
6.7.2 Error Model 
As described in Section 6.7.1, the success of linking two successive location updates 
depends on the prediction accuracy. The latter is affected by different errors due to GPS 
accuracy,          (speed) variation between two successive updates, and propagating 
errors from previous predictions. In this section, we will detail these errors and show how 
to use them in calculating uncertainty region,   .  
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6.7.2.1 GPS Precision error  
GPS precision error,       , is the error associated with the precision of the GPS 
system and devices used. This error varies from one device to another, modern GPS 
devices can give a precision error of 14 meters [73]. However, this precision is not 
maintained all the time, and GPS devices vendors supply extra information for buyers such 
as the percentage at which this value of precision error is guaranteed. For this reason a 
vehicle can be positioned in 2 dimensions by a circle of radius        , or in 3 dimensions 
by a sphere of the same radius. This error affects the prediction accuracy and increases the 
radius of    by the value       . 
6.7.2.2 Location prediction error  
To predict the next location of a vehicle from the current location information we use 
                                          , where              is the 
predicted location of object   at time     ,            is the current location of  , and 
           is the speed of    at time  . During the time period  ,            value 
may vary due to traffic conditions, this variation will cause incorrect calculations of 
             . We will call this type of error location prediction error,           .   
The prediction model assumes fixed speed over the time period    which is not true 
because, according to ALUM, an object   may change            without updating the 
database as far as            variation does not exceed a threshold,         . As    
increases, we expect            to increase; this is because we will have more speed 
(          ) variations during this period of time.            depends on the traffic 
conditions at the region where a moving object moves and on the value    between two 
successive updates.            affects prediction accuracy and  increases the radius of 
Uncertainties Region,   , by           . 
The value            cannot be directly calculated, it depends mainly on traffic 
conditions where a moving object moves. It also depends on the time interval    between 
two successive updates. The larger the time interval  , the larger           , and hence 
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the larger the radius of   ,    .  Calculating the exact             is not an easy task. It 
requires the knowledge of the exact next location of a moving object which in real world is 
unknown and needs to be predicted. However, it is possible to obtain an empirical model 
for this error using historical data and then using this model to estimate           . 
Details of calculating             are shown in Section 7.4. 
6.7.2.3 Inherent error 
This error occurs when we have more than one moving object inside    at time  , 
among which is the target object that an adversary is trying to link location updates with 
those at time     . Due to the fact of having more than one moving object in   , we will 
have more linking possibilities between current and expected   s, i.e.    at   and    at 
     in Figure 20. Expected    should be wide enough to contain all possible pairings of 
different pseudonyms. This causes an increase in the radius of the expected    by the 
value of the radius of the minimum circle that contains all moving objects in current   .  
We call this increase as       .  Figure 20 shows the concepts error model. 
The strength of         to enlarge the expected    depends on the number of objects 
in the current   and how far they are from each other. As the number of objects in current 
   increases,         increases causing an increase in the expected  . This in turn 
increases the probability of having more objects in expected    and hence increasing the 
Figure 21: The concept of error model 
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uncertainty of linking location updates. If the number of objects in current UR is 1, then 
       will be 0 meaning that it has no effect on increasing expected  . Section 6.8 
details how do we empirically calculate        from historical moving objects database. 
6.7.2.4 Complete Error Model 
After introducing the previous error terms, we finalize our error model for calculating 
expected    as follows: 
If number of moving objects at current   is only 1 then         will be 0,  and the 
expected   radius will be                   
If number of moving objects at current    is greater than 1 then         will be 
minimum radius of the circle containing all vehicles, and the expected   radius will 
be                          . 
We will use this error model to calculate the expected   , and then to calculate 
anonymity level inside it. 
6.8 k-Anonymity Level Calculation 
Anonymity can be defined as the state of a moving object   to be hidden among other 
objects in terms of time and location attributes. i.e. an object is anonymous if there exists 
other objects with the same values. Because of GPS precision error and other sources of 
errors, the definition can be relaxed to being hidden among other moving objects in a 
particular uncertainty region,   .  -anonymity metric is widely used to describe the 
anonymity level, it refers to the state of being anonymous among another     objects 
[59]. We will use this metric to calculate anonymity level at each   for each point on the 
trajectory of a moving object. The results of this metric will be used to compare between 
our update mechanism ALUM and periodical update mechanism. Algorithm 1 details how 
to calculate the anonymity level.  
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Algorithm 1: Calculating             for each location point at a particular 
vehicle’s trajectory 
Input:  : dataset of trajectories identified by pseudonym . 
Output:    : data set of location updates and their             values 
Procedure: 
1.           
2. for all Pseudonyms          
3.      for all time stamp     where     in               
4.                                          
5.                                               
  = RETRIEVE o WHERE (                          AND              
                      AND (                         ) ) 
6.                                    
7.            if(                ) 
8.         = radius of minimum circle containing all     objects in O. 
9.            else  
10.                        
11.       end   
12.   end      
The algorithm calculates the  -anonymity level for each point on the moving object’s 
(a moving object here is identified by his used pseudonym   ) trajectory. For 
each               in object  ’s trajectory, the algorithm first calculates the radius of 
uncertainty region,    , line 4. It then calculates the expected next location associated with 
pseudonym   ,                 . This value is determined by the expected time to the 
next update,   . Line 6 of Algorithm 1 represents a Future Temporal Logic, FTL, query 
[69] that retrieves all objects   that have the same update time, same direction, and exist in 
  . The anonymity level   is defined as the number of these objects in   . If    , then 
         should be set as the radius of the minimum circle containing all objects in   , line 
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9. This new value of         will be used in line 4 to update the radius of the 
expected  ,    , for the next iteration, i.e. next time stamp. 
For a pseudonym   ,             is determined by two values x-coordinate and y-
coordinate respectively. To calculate the radius of the minimum circle containing all 
moving objects that resides in a particular   , we keep track of the maximum and 
minimum x and y coordinates of the location updates for these objects,  namely     , 
    ,     , and     . In the Cartesian plane, (    ,     ),  (    ,     ) ,  (    , 
    ),  and (    ,    ) points can be used to represent a bounding rectangle around all 
the moving objects inside   . Figure 21 shows this rectangle,     . The minimum circle 
is centered at the midpoint of diagonal   , and called   on the figure.  The radius of the 
minimum circle is                , where       the distance between points   and   
of the rectangle     .  
 
Figure 22: Calculating the radius of the minimum circle 
6.9 Summary  
In this chapter, we explained in details the architecture of PA-CTM. We then detailed 
the design of ALUM and EALUM as a location update and pseudonym change mechanism. 
Then we provided an error model used to calculate the radius of UR which was used to 
calculate the anonymity level k. In the next chapter, we will provide the performance 
evaluation for ALUM and EALUM. 
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7.  PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS FOR PA-CTM 
In this chapter, we show our experimental results. We explain how to calculate the 
speed threshold,          ,the sub region weight threshold        , and the location 
prediction error,           .  A comparison among ALUM, EALUM, periodic and silent 
period update mechanisms in terms of anonymity and utility are also reported.  
7.1 Experimental Setup and Dataset 
Due to the lack of real GPS datasets, we used Thomas Brinkhoff simulator to 
generate GPS traces [74]. The generator follows the benchmarks of generating datasets by 
using real network models with speed and capacity limits. This enabled us to generate a 
more realistic dataset compared with datasets generated from other generators. The 
generator allows simulating different traffic scenarios by choosing proper parameter values. 
Figure 22 shows a map of San Francisco generated by the simulator. 
 
Figure 23: San Francisco simulator map 
We chose the city of San Francisco, SF, for generating our data. The area of SF is 
about 47.5 square miles, and the population is 818,163 in 2010. There are about 470,481 
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registered vehicles, and 534,829 driving licenses issued by 2010. The number of jobs is 
about 437,073 jobs in 2010 and about 38.9% of employees prefer to drive alone to their 
work locations [75]. According to this data, we generated four datasets for the four location 
update mechanisms ALUM, EALUM, periodic, and silent period with random period of 
[   ] timestamps.  
7.2 Choosing the Speed Threshold          
In our location update and pseudonym change mechanism, we suggest the update and 
pseudonym change under some conditions described in Section 6.4. According to these 
conditions, a pseudonym change and location update is triggered when the speed change of 
a vehicle exceeds the threshold value. The threshold value is to be determined according to 
the speed variations. The speed variance is calculated each timestamp and the value of the 
variance determines whether the movement is regular or irregular according to the value of 
        . The value of          should be chosen carefully to best classify regular and 
irregular traffic conditions. Incorrect          will result in an incorrect classification and 
may lead to lower performance in terms of quality and anonymity. For the best choice of 
        , we have first plotted  the number of updates generated for different          
values as shown in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 24: No. of location updates vs. SDThresh 
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The number of generated location updates from all vehicles can reflect regular or 
irregular traffic conditions. Under regular traffic flow, the curve in Figure 23 moves 
smoothly for low variance values and then performs a dramatic decrease before moving 
smoothly again. The point of this dramatic change is the best value of         . It 
separates regular and irregular traffic conditions. This point occurs between the values of 
7000 and 8000 space unit/timestamp
2
.  
Determining the exact threshold classification value is done using the derivative of 
the curve of Figure 23. The data is fitted using Matlab and the fitted curve is then 
differentiated. The point where exact dramatic speed variance occurs is 7280 (space 
unit/timestamp
2
) as shown in Figure 24.   
 
Figure 25: Determining the best SDThresh value 
Since different regions have different traffic activities, a global static          may 
not be that efficient. Hence we suggest the use of a local static value by calculating 
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         for each sub region. Users then use different          values for the different sub 
regions they visit. In our work, we used a global          value. 
7.3 Choosing Sub Region Weight Threshold        
Sub region weigh is used by EALUM to decide whether to update during silent 
period or not. By EALUM silent period, we mean the case where neither speed nor 
direction change occurs. When ALUM is to update according to the silent period condition, 
it first checks the weight of her sub region. If the weight is greater than a predefined 
weight,        , then update is performed. Otherwise, update is delayed for another silent 
period. The selection of the value of        affects the level of privacy as well as the data 
quality.  
We have divided San Francisco region into sub regions of 1km
2
 each. Then we have 
calculated the weights of each sub region (as described in Section 7.3) for a time interval of 
600 time stamps. The relative frequencies of the weights are shown in Figure 25. The 
values of weights range from 0 to 0.004.  
 
Figure 26: Relative frequencies of weights 
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We used the median value of the weights as        for the performance evaluation 
of ELAUM against the other location update mechanisms. However, we emphasize that 
        is to be set by the user herself according to her privacy preferences and the value 
here is for performance evaluations only.  
7.4 Calculating             
           is defined as the distance between the actual location of an object   and 
its expected location. It is calculated as 
                                             , where     denotes the 
absolute value function. We have calculated            for, ALUM, EALUM, periodic, 
and silent period. The percentiles of the distribution of            values are shown in 
Figure 26.  
 
Figure 27: LocPredERR percentiles 
As shown in Figure 26, the frequencies of high            values in ALUM, 
EALUM, and silent period are higher than periodic. This means that their uncertainties 
regions will be larger and hence privacy will be better. An important factor affecting 
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           is the time gap between two successive updates. As shown in Table 6, the 
higher the time gap the higher the mean of           .  
Table 6: Mean location prediction error for moderate traffic 
Moderate daily traffic scenario 
   Mean            (m) 
1 18.90 
2 37.51 
3 55.76 
4 73.62 
5 91.07 
6 107.90 
For calculating the radius of uncertainties region, we will assume a strong adversary 
that can predict correctly the time gap,   , between two successive updates, hence 
           will be chosen according to Table 6. For       , we will use the value of 14 
meters [73].  
7.5             Results 
We have calculated the anonymity level for every point on each trajectory. The 
anonymity level was calculated as the number of location updates inside the uncertainty 
region, UR. The average  -anonymity level for the datasets is summarized in Table 7. From 
Table 7, we can infer that EALUM data is the best in terms of anonymity level k. 
Table 7: Overall average anonymity level 
       
ALUM 5.575 
Periodic  3.043 
Silent Period 2.774 
EALUM  6.19 
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The relative frequency of the occurrences of different   values is shown in Figure 27. 
From Figure 27 we see that both periodic and silent period behave almost similar while 
ALUM and ELAUM behave better for larger   values. It is also clear that EALUM is better 
than ALUM for even small k values. This puts EALUM on top of location update 
mechanisms in terms of privacy level. 
 
Figure 28: k-anonymity relative frequencies 
7.6 Utility 
Utility is defined as how far ALUM is useful for traffic monitoring. We used Relative 
Area Coverage (RAC), Weighted Road Coverage (WRC), and Relative Communication 
Cost (RCC) as utility metrics. The results of these metrics are reported in this section. 
7.6.1 Relative Area Coverage (RAC): 
We divided the area of San Francesco into blocks of 1 km
2
 each. The number of 
location updates generated in a period of 60 time stamps is calculated for each block. Each 
block is then classified as covered if there are location updates in that region. Otherwise, 
the block is classified as not-covered. We have generated a black and white image (binary 
image) where each pixel represents a particular block. White pixels represent covered 
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blocks where black pixels represent not-covered blocks. Relative Area Coverage, RAC, is 
calculated as the ratio of the coverage of each location update mechanism relative to the 
coverage of periodic location update mechanism. This is due to the fact that the best 
achievable coverage can be generated using periodic updates. Figure 28 shows the area 
coverage map for Periodic, ALUM, silent period, and EALUM location update 
mechanisms. RAC is reported below each image. 
 
Figure 29: Block coverage binary images 
As shown from Figure 28, ALUM has an RAC of 90%. This means that ALUM can 
be used efficiently in traffic monitoring. EALUM is the worst in coverage, this is due to the 
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fact of having less updates in lower weight sub regions. An important issue is that the many 
non-covered blocks face few traffic loads. 
7.6.2 Weighted Road Coverage (WRC) 
The weighted road coverage (WRC) metric was proposed by Hoh et al [24] to 
measure the utility of their uncertainty path cloaking mechanism. Traffic is monitored for a 
relatively long period of time over that region. The weight of each sub region is then 
calculated as the number of updates generated in that sub region divided by the total 
number of location updates performed in the total region using periodic update mechanism. 
Table 8 summarizes the results of WRC for the four location update mechanisms.  
Table 8: WRC results 
Update mechanism  WRC % 
Periodic 100% 
ALUM 91% 
Silent Period 88% 
EALUM 83% 
EALUM is at the bottom of the coverage ratio with a pretty good value of 83%. The 
decision between ALUM and EALUM is a tradeoff between privacy and coverage.  It is 
important to note that we used the median of the weights as the        value for EALUM. 
However, for privacy reasons users may adjust it to larger values and hence reduce the 
coverage ratio of EALUM.  
7.6.3  Data Quality and Communication Cost 
The number of location updates affects two utility parameters, data quality and 
communication cost. Generally, the lower the number of location updates the lower the 
quality of the data. On the other hand, the lower the number of location updates, the lower 
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the communication cost required to perform these updates. The choice of these parameters 
is a tradeoff between the required quality of the data and the communication cost.  
For traffic monitoring, the aim is to generate a current traffic map that covers well the 
area of interest. According to RAC and WRC metrics described in Section 7.6, ALUM and 
EALUM feed the traffic monitoring system with necessary data required for generating 
current traffic map. This means that ALUM and EALUM are suitable for traffic 
monitoring. However, in other applications that require higher data quality such as traffic 
prediction, ALUM and EALUM may not be sufficient and extra location updates may be 
required to fulfill the prediction requirements. 
In traffic monitoring systems, the communication cost plays an important role in the 
successful of these systems. The penetration rate is defined as the percentage of vehicles 
carrying traffic monitoring equipment [24]. As the communication cost decreases, the 
number of subscribed users will increase. This in turn increases the penetration rate. An 
increase in the penetration rate results in an increase in the total number of location updates. 
This eventually increases the utility of the system in terms of coverage metric discussed in 
Section 7.6. 
The communication cost is directly proportional to the number of generated location 
updates. The relative communication cost (RCC) is calculated as the total number of 
location updates in each location update mechanism divided by the total number of location 
updates using periodic update mechanism. Table 9 summarizes these results. As shown in 
Table 9, ALUM and EALUM decrease the communication cost significantly.  
Table 9: RCC results 
Update mechanism RCC % 
Periodic 100% 
ALUM 41.35% 
Silent Period 35.7% 
EALUM 34.4% 
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It is important to remember that ALUM and EALUM have weighted relative road 
coverage of 91%, and 83% respectively.  This significant decrease in communication cost 
while maintaining a very good coverage ratio makes ALUM and EALUM effective for 
traffic monitoring. The decision between ALUM and EALUM becomes an issue of 
privacy. If users prefer better level of privacy and more control on that level, then EALUM 
may be selected. On the other hand, for larger utility (area coverage) ALUM may be 
selected instead of EALUM since it has better coverage ratio.   
7.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we showed how to calculate both            and       . We also 
calculated the anonymity level for the four location update mechanisms ALUM, EALUM, 
silent period, and periodic. The results showed that ALUM, and EALUM are better in 
terms of our privacy metric than periodic and silent period location update mechanism. 
Utility metrics showed that ALUM is sufficient for traffic monitoring with a significant 
decrease in communication cost.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Utilizing existing networks for the development of Collaborative Traffic Monitoring 
(CTM) is cheaper and needs no extra deployments. Therefore, it is more preferable than 
having a dedicated infrastructure network. However, such systems require more work for 
strengthening security and privacy. In this thesis, we proposed a privacy aware 
collaborative traffic monitoring system, PA-CTM, which adopts existing privacy solutions 
proposed for dedicated infrastructure, and works on existing networks. Users use 
pseudonyms to authenticate to traffic server and update their location or query current 
traffic status. They can also change their pseudonyms to enhance their privacy against the 
traffic server.  
As the subtopics of this thesis, we firstly proposed a novel privacy-preserving 
pseudonym providing system, called CoRPPS (Collusion Resistant Pseudonym Providing 
System). In CoRPPS, several trusted entities are employed and the task of user 
authentication is split among several authentication servers. Other tasks and the 
corresponding user data are also split among trusted entities such that the collusion among 
them does not effectively link the real identity of a user to a pseudonym. This approach and 
the use of reusable tokens as anonymous identifiers in our design yielded high level of 
privacy for the users. The challenge of this design is that the link between the real user 
identities and pseudonyms should have been established by the request of law enforcement. 
In other words, there should have been a backdoor in the system, which contradicts the 
privacy requirements. We addressed this challenging issue in CoRPPS by enforcing all 
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trusted parties to collaborate in the process of identity revealing. Analytical and simulation 
results showed that CoRPPS is applicable for different types of services; it can be tuned for 
different number of users according to the required level of anonymity, and the desired 
maximum collision probability. Our performance results also showed that CoRPPS is 
highly resistant against collusion attacks. 
Our PA-CTM uses a novel autonomous location update mechanism, ALUM, which is 
managed by moving objects according to traffic conditions and hence does not require the 
existence of a trusted third party for controlling the location update mechanism. To enhance 
privacy, EALUM (Enhanced version of ALUM) utilizes traffic weights at different regions 
and perform location update and pseudonym change according to that. Our proposals 
ALUM and EALUM create a mix zone in an autonomous way. Experimental results 
showed that ALUM and EALUM can be used efficiently for traffic monitoring. The choice 
of ALUM or EALUM is a tradeoff between privacy and coverage. They both enhance 
privacy and reduce communication cost. However, ALUM is better than EALUM in terms 
of area coverage and the latter has a slightly better privacy results. 
ALUM and ELAUM are effective for traffic monitoring based on synthetic datasets. 
It might be better if we applied ALUM and EALUM for real datasets. A comparison 
between our results for synthetic datasets and results of real datasets is intended to be done 
as a future work. For traffic prediction ALUM and EALUM may not be so efficient. As a 
future work, we intend to study efficiency of ALUM for traffic prediction and strategic 
planning. It may also worth studying incorporating other parameters for this purpose. These 
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parameters include the road capacities, average speed, and daily time periods. Incorporation 
of such parameters requires detailed information about the regions of study.  
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